College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Colonial Lawyer

1987

Colonial Lawyer, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1987)
Editors of Colonial Lawyer

Repository Citation
Editors of Colonial Lawyer, "Colonial Lawyer, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1987)" (1987). Colonial Lawyer. 27.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmcl/27

Copyright c 1987 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmcl

Law School Journals

From the Nation's Oldest Law School

THE COLONIAL LAWYER:
A Journal of Virginia Law and Public Policy
NUMBER 2

FALL 1987

VOLUME 16

Editor's Brief

Articles
The Court of Appeals of Virginia:
A Quantitative Review.

...................................

81

Friend or Foe of the First Amendment? ......................

93

The Fairness Doctrine:

Recovery for Asbestos Abatement Programs:
A Theory ofRecovery for Municipalities. ....................
Asbestos Update ...................................

101
113

Emotional Distress When Libel Has Failed:
The Faulty Logic of Falwell v. Flynt.

. ...................... 115

A STUDENT PUBLICATION OF
THE MARSHALL·WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA: A QUANTITATIVE REVIEW
by
Michael F. McAuliffe
Introduction
While Virginia's appellate court system is one of the oldest in the nation,l it
has only recently joined the majority of states with a tiered appellate system 2 by
adding an intermediate appellate court (lAC). The Court of Appeals of Virginia
commenced operation on January I, 1985, and its operating experiences in the past
two and one-half years provide a valuable set of quantitative data from which a
preliminary statistical performance evaluation is possible.
At

the

present

time,

no

caseload/workload

analysis

exists

comparing

Virginia's intermediate appellate court experience with other sample states. A
statistical profile of the transition from a single court appellate system to a tiered
appellate court structure provides information vital in assessing the system's
strengths and weaknesses and thus is a useful tool for judicial policymaking.
The present article (I) develops a framework for evaluating the performance
of the court by defining the relevant performance variables, (2) compares ths:
experience of adding an intermediate appellate court with other states that added
an intermediate appellate court after 1980, and (3) briefly discusses the policy
implications of a quantitative snapshot of the court's operations.
Limitations
The present work does not evaluate the Court of Appeals of Virginia or the
other sampled courts by the quality of decisionmaking or the degree of "just"
results. While inferences may be offered in terms of how the quantitative variables
may affect the legal functioning of the court, they are made in a general context
and specific applications of such comments are left for the reader.
Also, statistical analysis is dependent on the integrity of the data set and of

I The OTlgms of the court date back to the Quarter Court of 1623. For a
brief historical discussion of Virginia's appellate system, see THE STATE OF THE
JUDICIARY REPORT 27 (Virginia 1986) [hereinafter JUDICIARY REPORT, 1986].
2 Comment, The Virginia Judicial Council's Intermediate Court Proposal, 16 U.
RICH. L. REV. 209 (1981); see STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1987 (National
Center for State Courts 1987) (publication available to public in January, 1988).
The states, as of 1986, that have an intermediate appellate court(s) are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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the ability to control for other variables. Thus, while the methodology employed in
this article appears to be sound,3 the conclusions must nevertheless be tentative.
The Development of the Court of Appeals of Virginia
A brief discussion of the goals and objectives relevant to the creation of the
court of
evaluating

appeals is necessary

to

provide a

baseline expectation measure in

the court's performance using statistical criteria. A comprehensive

analysis of the circumstances and issues leading to the creation of the court of
appeals is covered in several earlier works. 4
With the passage of the present state constitution in 1970, which explicitly
gave the legislature the power to create an intermediate appellate court,5 the
movement for legislative action intensified. 6 Several studies were completed that
attempted to provide a suitable justification for adding another appellate court. 7
Concerns about the appellate court system centered on (I) appellate caseload
trends, (2) total appellate capacity, (3) the incentive to appeal a case and (4)
judicial resources. 8
Appellate court performance, however, was typically not discussed in terms of
workload measures (e.g.; disposition rates as a percentage of filings and other
processing measures such as time standards). The appellate debate, throughout the
1960's and 70's, primarily focused on the input (filings) of the appellate system
only reinforcing the input argument with assertions of delay and other workload
3 The table data (filings and dispositions) are taken from the state judicial
annual reports of Idaho, South Carolina and Virginia for the years covered in the
tables. Minnesota's data are from the state appellate statistical profiles on file
with the Court Statistics and Information Management Project (CSIM) of the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC). Thus, the origin of the raw numbers are
from the administrative office of the state court systems and reflect the most
complete data set available for each state. The standard computations are (I) sums
of filings and dispositions and (2) dispositions as a percentage of filings for all
individual courts and for the state totals. Dispositions as a percentage of filings
should adequately approximate the input/output ratio of the court(s). This
computation should give a more accurate picture of how a court or court system
processes cases than does mere filings or dispositions data alone. Time standard
analysis (the time necessary to complete the various parts of an appeal, i.e.
docketing to oral argument) would also present useful information concerning
consumption of judicial resources. Unfortunately, such information is currently not
available for the majority of state appellate courts.
4 One of the earliest and most comprehensive works is Lilly and Scalia,
Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia? 57 VA. L. REV. 3 (1971); see also Comment,
supra note 2.
5 VA. CONST. art. VI,

2.

6 See VIRGINIA COURT ORGANIZATION STUDY, A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (1979) (an unpublished report submitted
to the Virginia Judicial Council and available through the National Center for State
Courts).
7 See Id.
8 See Comment, supra note 2, at 210-12.
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measures. 9 Thus, the debate over adding an lAC in Virginia did not provide clear
measures for later policymakers to use in evaluating the court's performance.
Additionally, fears of an increased general propensity to litigate and the
growth in the Commonwealth's population helped form the backdrop for reform
supporters and opponents to struggle with the issue of how to best address the
Commonwealth's long-term jUdicial needs.
By 1982, legislation was introduced into the General Assembly which would
create an intermediate court of appeals.!O

The legislation, in large part, was a

result of a report by the Judicial Council of Virginia. I I

In 1983, the General

Assembly adopted the legislation creating an intermediate court of appeals to be
effective January I, 1985. 12
earlier legislation and

However, the 1984 General Assembly amended the

instituted several important changes,

including making

criminal appeals to the lAC discretionary in nature.!3 Thus, when the court
commenced operation in 1985, its structure and jurisdiction were the product of
intense and prolonged analysis and compromise.
The present statutory scheme for the court of appeals provides that the court
has wide-ranging jurisdiction with a specific degree of finality accorded many of
its decisions. 14
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has discretionary
jurisdiction to review all cases pursuant to statutorily mandated criteria.!5 In
operation, the court of appeals has exercised a significant level of autonomy with
only a minimal caseload being processed up to the state supreme court for full
review.1 6
Overall, the statutory mandate for the court reveals an overt attempt to
"down load" specific areas of review and provide a system capable of processing
appeals with more flexible management mechanisms. Also, this framework allows the
court of appeals to develop a body of case law, providing all participants in the
appellate process an increased degree of predictability for potential appeals.
Thus, the proper context for evaluating the court's performance must account
for the pre-operation expectations and the perceived needs the court was designed
to meet. In the case of Virginia's lAC, the available literature suggests that

9 See, e.g., Note, The Virginia Special Court of Appeals: Constitutional Relief
for an Overburdened Court, 8 WM & MARY L. REV. 244 (I967); Comment, supra
note 2, at 211.
10 Comment, supra note 2, at 209.
II [d.
12 THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984 45 (1985) [hereinafter
JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984]; see VA. CODE ANN. § § 17-116.01 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1987).
13 JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984 at 45; see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.116.05.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1987).
14 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.116.07 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
15 VA. CODE ANN. § § 17.116.08, .09 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
16 For example, in 1986, of 228 petitions filed for review to the Supreme
Court of Virginia from the Court of Appeals, only three were granted.JUDICIAR Y
REPORT, 1986, supra note I, at 30.
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concerns for appellate capacity, filing trends, and appellate access formed the
nexus around which the court was developed and initially implemented.
The Court's Performance: A Statistical Analysis
Within the context of high expectations and complex organizational and
jurisdictional compromise, the court has completed over two and a half years of
operation. A useable set of performance data is now available for examination.
A statistical analysis of the appellate court systems of Virginia, Minnesota,
South Carolina and Idaho, all of which added an intermediate appellate court after
1980, can address the following performance areas: (I) the number of appeals/cases
the courts disposed of as a percentage of the number of appeals/cases filed with
the courts; (2) the trend, if any, of appeal/case filings and dispositions; (3) a
comparative

view

of

appellate

performance

including

common

transitional

experiences; and (4) possible backlog and capacity issues as measures of policy
fulfillment.
Tables 1-4 show a year by year breakdown of key variables for the states
that added intermediate appellate courts after

1980. Initially, the

degree of

comparability between the states varies. The footnotes in the tables indicate the
relevant differences in counting procedures and other data composition caveats. 17
In evaluating Virginia's experience, a two-fold approach must be taken. A
discussion of the Virginia data in isolation provides the initial issue analysis; thena discussion of notable common occurrances is possible from which conclusions can
be gleaned.
The Transitional Experience
Notably, the Tables 1-4 reveal several characteristic experiences. First, the
initial year of operation for the lAC is marked by complications typical of shifting
appellate caseloads and jurisdictions. The most obvious measure of such transition
complications is seen in disposition rate fluctuations.
Table I shows that, in 1985, the court of appeals disposed of 52% of the
cases/appeals filed with the court. Importantly, appeals sought to the Supreme
Court of Virginia from cases decided on or after October I, 1984 for which the
court of appeals had jurisdiction, were docketed with the new IAC. 18 Thus, the
intermediate appellate court started operation with a pending caseload. In 1986, the
disposition rate for the lAC increased to 90% of filings. Interestingly, new filings
were fairly constant, indicating the court was, in 1986, processing more cases in
relation to its 1985 activity.
Tables 2, 3 and

4

reinforce the observation of transitional

disposition

fluctuations. In their first year of operation, Minnesota, South Carolina and Idaho
all experienced relatively low disposition rates when compared to filings. Also, the
17 For example, instances of possible double counting are noted when cases
are refiled with the appellate court and the case load cannot be broken down to
separate them.
18 JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984, supra note 12, at 45.
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intermediate appellate courts of all the states increased their disposition rates in
later years. For example, Idaho (Table 2), which added an lAC in 1982, shows a
steady, significant increase in the disposition rate as a precentage of filings: 1982(32%); 1983-(67%); 1984-(120%); 1985-(190%); and 1986-(100%).
The initial low disposition rates for all the sampled states indicate that
transition for the court is a slow, incremental process. While this conclusion is not
surprising, the common experience of all four states points to a longer evaluation
period for judging a court's performance record with quantitative measures. With
the Virginia lAC in its third year of operation, the court may still be in its
operational learning curve. The other states' experiences should reveal that the
task of implementing an lAC, even where otherwise clearly needed, is not an
immediate panacea for appellate workload issues.
Predictably, the lAC disposition rate fluctuation is reflected in the overall
appellate disposition rate. The addition of the lAC puts a burden on the whole
appellate system. The change, in terms of caseload filings and jurisdiction, might
significantly reduce the processing ability of both courts in the short term. Again,
the conclusion seems reasonable that the evaluation of the new appellate court
system cannot be cast in terms of quick relief. The operation of the appellate
system must be framed in a long term scheme that specifically accounts for
transi tional com plica tions.
Appellate Capacity
Appellate

capacity

represents

a

second

area

of

analysis

addressed by the ta1Jles. The term ·capacity· is not used

appropriately

in the context of

appellate processing limits. Rather, the capacity of an appellate court, in this
article, is deemed a function of the volume inputed into a court and the resulting
rate of output. As the 'absolute case load limit a court can ultimately process is not
easily quantifiable, since a court can theoretically build a limitless pending
caseload, the more useful measure is the trend of the rate of disposition in
relation to filing patterns. By examining the movement of filing rates over time
and the corresponding rates of disposition, the analysis builds on the previous
discussion

of

the

transitional

data

and

seeks

to

identify

any

total

workload/caseload experiences.
An examination of Table 1 shows Virginia experienced a total appellate filing
increase of 40% from 1984 to 1985.

The large increase in appellate filings could

indicate that the previous channels open to litigants after a trial decision were not
adequate or that the new channels of appeal are significantly more accessible. The
evaluation of whether the rapid increase in appellate filings from 1984,1985 is
positive or negative rests with the determination of the merits of the additional
appeals.
While the evaluation of the merits of the incremental appeals is a qualitative
analysis outside the scope of this work, several points are worth noting. First, the
filings increase does not appear to continue from 1985 to 1986. The Virginia
appellate court system experienced a modest 3% increase in appellate filings from
1985 to 1986 (see Table 1). The difference in the filing rate increases may be a
function of numerous variables, including the perception of a change in the
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accessibility of the appellate court system. 19

This explanation suggests the initial

large filings increase represents an adjustment process resulting from the appellate
channels appearing more accessible to litigants. Thus, a pre-existing demand for
the resources of the appellate court system combined with an increased perception
of accessibility would be consistent with the significant first year filing increase
seen in Table I.
Also, filing patterns must be put in the context .of how the appellate system
processes filings. Both the supreme court and the court of appeals have primarily
discretionary jurisdiction. Thus, the majority of appellate filings do not necessarily
translate into workload measures. This is important as the filing rate for the court
may be a deceiving unit of count when focusing on appellate workload.
Similar to Virginia's experience, Table 3 reveals total appellate filings in
Minnesota increased dramatically in the years following the implementation of an
intermediate appellate court (1983, 1984, and 1985). However, disposition rates were
high before the addition of the lAC, indicating that increased capacity, not backlog
(pending caseload), was the most visible effect of adding another appellate court.
Conversely, for South Carolina and Idaho (Tables 4 and 2) the total caseload
of the appellate court system did not dramatically increase after the lAC was
added. Thus, in subsequent years, disposition rates as a percentage of filings
usually

increased

for

both

courts

in

the

appellate

system.

The

increase

in

disposition rates, without an increase in filing rates, could indicate the opportunity
to reduce any pending case load present before the lAC started operation.
Tables 1-4 show two distinct appellate patterns at work. Table

(Virginia)

and Table 3 (Minnesota) appear to have experienced significant filing increases, at
least for the year the lAC started operation. Tables 2 (Idaho) and 4 (South
Carolina) indicate fairly comparable filing levels, but show high disposition rates.
The implication of these differences surfaces as policymakers start to evaluate
post-modification appellate court performance. The statistical difference between
the two sets of states might be found in the operation of the appellate system
prior to the addition of the lAC. However, this pre-implementation experience
often rigidly dictates the subsequent evaluation process to the point of precluding
any subsequent, but unarticulated, operational benefits.

An;Evaluation

Ultimately, in the context of judicial management, how well the justification
for adding the lAC matches the post-implementation experience will determine the
initial
analysis

label of "solution" or "symptom" attached
reveals

that

if

Virginia

and,

to

a

to the court. The foregoing

lesser

extent,

Minnesota

were

anticipating an opportunity to quickly reduce the pending caseload, the addition of
the lAC probably did not meet expectations. Alternatively, if Idaho and South

19 See McAuliffe, Virginia Tort Reform: A Case of Crying Wolf! 16 COL.
LA W. 4, 12 (Spring 1987), where the proposition is made that the perception of an
increase in trial case filings and recoveries may be a causal factor in the assertion
of a litigation "crisis". Appellate filings may be subject to the same process; see
also Roper, The Propensity to Litigate in State Trial Courts. 1981-1984, 1984-1985
11 JUST. SYS. J. 262, 267 (1987).
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Carolina thought appellate capacity was the pressing need basis for adding another
appellate court, their prediction may have been less than accurate.
However, in Virginia's case, a need to open the appellate channels, at least· to
the degree of not creating potentially unresponsive institutional barriers (e.g., one
appellate court

with

primarily discretionary jurisdiction) seems to have been

addressed. If the observation is accurate that the first year increase in filings
points

to an

adjustment

process,

the tiered

appellate

court system

may be

appropriately responding to a demand for some minimal aPllellate review for more
cases.
Also, if the transitional analysis approximates a real world process, low initial
disposition rates should not be viewed as a measure of ineffectiveness. The
complications of adding an lAC seem to be a part of the appellate modification
process and should diminish over time. The Court of Appeals of Virginia and the
other sample states' intermediate appellate courts should be evaluated with longer
time frames than previously thought appropriate and viewed in terms of addressing
changing needs.
Finally, even if the "perceived" need for adding a court does not appear to
have been met, the tiered appellate court system may well be the appropriate
answer to other important policy concerns not adequately developed in the preimplementation legislative debate. For example, the need for increased appellate
access may have been the accurate justification for adding an lAC in Virginia, but
the focus of the initial debate, for some, was the issue of reducing the pending·
caseload.
A quantitative review of the court of appeals' (indeed the whole appellate
court system's) operation enables policymakers to monitor the new mechanism for
processing appeals. A two and one-

half year snapshot of Virginia's' appellate

court system leads to the conclusion that the Commonwealth needed additional
doors through which appellate review could be sought. The structure of the court
of appeals, its primary use of discretionary jurisdiction and the oversight process
are all mechanisms designed to enable the court to open and shut the door as the
merits of the appeal dictate; nothing, quantitatively, is present to dispute the
conclusion that those mechanisms are indeed working properly.
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Table 1
Appellate FIling/Disposition
Data for Jurisdictions that
Added an Intermediate
Appellate Court After 1980
1980-1986

VIRGINIA
Court of ApDeal s

SUDremLCourt
Mandatory

Discretionary

Mal

N/A
N/A

2,091
1,860

2,091'
1,860 '

2,091'
1,860 '

N/A

89%

89%'

89%'

N/A
N/A

2,257
1,823

2,257'
1, 823'

2,257'

t1allita.t.Q.Q

tli.screti onary

lilia.l

State Total s

1980:

F11ed ......................... .
Disposed ...................•..•
Dispositions as a percentage
of fillngs .................. .
1981 :

Filed ....................•..•..
01 sposed ...................••..

Oi spos it Ions as a percentage
of fillngs .................. .

1,823 1

N/A

81%

81%'

81%'

N/A
N/A

2,290
2,318

2,290 '
2,318'

2,290 '
2,318'

N/A

101%

101%'

101%'

N/A
N/A

2,073
1,922

2,073'

2,073'

1,922'

1.922

1982 :

Filed ......................... .
Oi sposed .......••..............
Dispositions as a percentage
of f11lngs ...•••.....•...•...
1983 :
00
00

Flied ..................•...•...
Disposed •............•....•••••

1

01 spos it Ions as a percentage

of f111ngs ..•...........••...

N/A

93%

93%1

93%'

N/A
N/A

1,915
1,919

1,9 IS'
1,919'

1,915'
1,919'

N/A

100%

100%'

N/A
N/A

1,043
1,321

1984 :

Filed ...•....••.....•..........
Disposed ........••...•••.......
01spostt tons as a percentage
of fi llngs .......•...........

100%'

"1985 :

Fil ed ..•...•....•........•.....
01 sposed ....••••••...........•.
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings •••.••.•...........

1,043
1,321

538
216

1,103
637

1,641
853

2,684'
2,174'

N/A

127%

127%

40%

58%

52%

8U;'

N/A
N/A

1,232
1,095

1,232
1,095

423
476

1,113
908

1,536
1,384

2,768'
2,479'

N/A

89%

89%

113%

82%

90%

90%'

1986:

FI led ......•••••••••......•....
Di sposed ....••••••.•...........
Disposlt\ons as a percentage
of fillngs ..••...•....•......

N/A

year Intermediate Appellate Court started.
not appllcable.
data not available.

Footnotes:
'Totals are Incomplete but comparable. Data do not include appeals of right such as appeals from the State Corporation
Conmisslon and cases Involving the death penalty.
Source:

State Judicial Annual Reports, 1980-1986.

Table 2
Appellate Filing/Disposition
Data for Jurisd1cttons that Added an
lntermedtate Appellate Court After 1980
19BO-1986
IDAHO
S~II;!(cme
~

Ccuct

Discretionary

eDuct gf
IgUl

~

AIH2CD 1S

Discretionary

IgUl

State Totals

1960:

Ft led

D, sposed ...................... .
OisposHtons as a percentage
of filings .................. .
1981 :
ft led ..............•..•...•••..
Dt sposed ...................... .

NfA
NfA

NfA
NfA

43B
316

43B
316

NfA

NfA

B6X

NfA
NfA

UfA

435 1

NfA

363'

435 I
363 I

B6X

NfA

NfA

83X'

83%'

UfA
NfA

UfA
NfA

31B
101

UJ
NJ

31B
101

551'

Z53 J

NfA

NfA

109%'

32%

NJ

32:1:

64:1:'

319
310

49
80

36B
450

16S I
111 ,

NJ
NJ

165
111

533
61S

116%

163%

122X

67%

NJ

67%

115%

NJ
NJ

146
\15

555'
582'

o i spos 1 t \ ons as a percentage
of filingS ..........•.......•
'1982 :
Fi led ...•••........••......••..

Disposed ...................... .
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings .................. .

Z33'

354 J

1983 :
00

>C>

Fi led ......................... .
Disposed ...................... .
Oispositions as a percentage
of f11 ,ngs ................. ..
1984 :

~~!:~S~d':::::::::::::::::::::::' .
DlsposiUons as a percentage
of filings .................. .

1985 :

409 l

352'

60
55

401'

146
115

101%'

92%

100%'

120%

NJ

120%

105%'

440 D

NJ
NJ

149
282

589 0

349 J

Fi led '"
Dlsposed .................... .
DispOS1tions as a percentage

348 J
311 J

92'
99'

432°

149
282

of filings ............•.....•
1986:

96%'

108%1

98%"

190%

NJ

190X

121%"

Fi led .....
. ......... .
Disposed ...................... .
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings .................. .

NJ
N/A

714 D

28B
359

77
11

365
430

174
114

NJ
NJ

114
114

539
604

125X

92X

118X

100%

NJ

100:1:

112X

year Intermediate Appellate Court started.
not app1 icable.
no jurisdictloo.
data not available.

Footnotes:
°1985 figure represents some double counting. Discretionary pettt\ons granted review are counted once as a petHion and
again when they are reftled as mandatory cases.
110 1984,

no data were avai table on the number of requests to appeal.

J19B,. '985 data includes some discretionary cases reviewed on the merits.

but are comparable.
Source:

Slate Jud\cial Annual Reports, 1980-1906.

Also. 1982 data includes all case types.

Table 3

Appellate Filing/Disposition
Data for Jurisdictions that
Added an Intermediate
Appellate Court After 1980
1980-1986

MINNESOTA
______~C2V~I-A~~p~ea~ILs~_______

SUDreme Court
Mandatory

0' screti onary

!oW

!:1l!!l!!lloa

Discretjon~

I!!lll

1980 :

Filed ............•.............
Disposed ..•...•.•....•........•
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings ...•..•............

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A

1981 :

Filed ......••..................
01 sposed ...................... .
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings ...•...............

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

£.tate Total s

1,391'
1,356'

1, 391'
1,356'

98%'

98%'

1982:

Fi led ......................... .
01 sposed ..................•....
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings .................. .

1,682
1,592

1,682
1,592

N/A

N/A

95%

1,311
1,360

6
3

1,3 I 7
1,363

663
105

18
12

681
117

1,998
1,480

104%

50%

104%

16%

67%

17%

74%

1,918
1,722

118
III

2,036
1,833

2,613
2,922

95%

'1983 :
."

o

fll ed ............•.......•.....
01 sposed ..•................••..
Dispositions as a percentage
of 'ft lings ......•........•...
1984 :

Filed ..........••..•...........
Disposed .....•.................
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings ..•................

216
938

361
151

577
1,089

434%

42%

189%

90%

94%

90%

112%

1985:
FIl ed ......................... .

211

Disposed ......................•
DIspositions as a percentage
of ft lings ..........•........

329

575
626

786
955

2,089
2,061

80
84

2,169
2,145

2,955
3,100

156%

109%

122%

99%

105%

99%

105%

176
159

595
624

771

1,965

783

1,998

90
84

2,055
2,082

2,826
2,865

90%

105%

102%

102%

93%

101%

101%

1986:

filed ......................... .
01 sposed ...................... .
Dispositions as a percentage
of filings .................. .

N/A

year Intermediate Appellate Court started.
not applicable.
data not available.

Footnotes:
'1981 data do not Include administrative agency appeals.
Source:

State Appellate Statistical Profiles, National Center for State Courts.

Table 4
Appellate f'tl1ng/DtsposHion
Data for Jur'lsd\ct 1005 that
Added an Intermedt ate
Appellate Court After 1980
1980-1986
SOUTH CAROLINA

SU!;Ircme CauCl.

tIaildlllIa

Discretionarx

Court

Ililll

IIa!llIWla

gf

AIUiu:a]:i

DiscretignAry

IOlll

State Totals

1980 :

fi led ......................... .
D;sposed ...................... .
0\ spas \ t; ons as a percentage

of fil'tngs .................. .

921

921

N/A

N/A

N/A
NO

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

NIA
N/A

N/A
N/A

I ,03~
810

1,035
610

N/A

N/A

78%

78%

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

971
614

971
614

NIA

N/A

63~

NIA

900
499

30
26

NJ
NJ

(270t' 30
(34., 26

NJ

(13%.) 8n

1981 :

Fi led ......................... .
Disposed ... ................... .
0; spas it; ons as a percentage

of filings .................. .
196Z:
Fl1ed ......................... .
Disposed ...................... .

OisposHions as a percentage

'"

of f; hUgs .....
'1963:
Flled ................... .

--I

63%
930

Disposed ...................... .

N/A

N/A
N/A

Oispositions as a percentage
of filings ... ,' .............. .
1964 :

NIA

NIA

~"

87%

479

492/

NJ
HJ

404
441

896'

~25

~7X

F\ led ......................... .
Disposed ...................... .

N/A

NIA
N/A

441'

404
441

Dlspos1tions as a percentage
of filings .................. .

N/A

N/A

90~1

109'l;

HJ

109%

99%'

4~1

HJ
NJ

391
398

954'

884'

1985;

Filed ....................... .
Dhposed ....... .

H/A

N/A
N/A

475'
556'

391
398

Oispositions as a percentage
of filings .............. .

N/A

N/A

lln l

102\

NJ

117%

110%'

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

H/A
N/A

H/A

HJ
NJ

H/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

NIA

NJ

N/A

H/A

1986:
Fi led ......................... .
Disposed ...................... .

N/A

866'

Di spas i t 1ons as a percentage

of f111og5 ........... .

tTransfers from the Supreme Court.

Transfers not included \n state total.

:= year Intermediate Appellate Court started (September 1. 1983).
:: not appltcable.

NJ
no juriSdiction.
N/A : data not ava; lable.

Footnotes:
'1984 and 1985 totals do not include discretionary petittons that were dented review or otherwise
d ism; sscd/w I thdraw/sett 1cd.
Source:

State Jud,clal Annual Reports

I

1980-1985.

THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE:
FRIEND OR FOE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
by
E. Diana Hamner
Felicia L. Silber
Introduction
On August 4, 1987, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) abandoned
the controversial Fairness Doctrine l

because the doctrine "violated the First

Amendment rights of broadcasters and, therefore, was no longer in the public
in terest."2

The

Fairness

Doctrine

imposed on

broadcasters

two

interrelated

obligations in return for the privilege, granted by the government, to use a portion
of the broadcasting spectrum.

The Fairness Doctrine required licensees (I) "to

provide 'coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest

in

the

community served by the licensees"3 and (2) "to provide a reasonable opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints· on such issues."4

The decision to

eliminate the Fairness Doctrine is not much of a surprise in view of the Reagan
era of governmental deregulation.

This FCC decision closely followed a June 19,

1987, Presidential veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987,5 a bill which
would have codified the Fairness Doctrine. 6
The public should note that the disappearance of the Fairness Doctrine does
not signal total deregulation of the broadcasting content.

In its August 1987

decision, the FCC specifically acknowledged that the ruling against the Fairness
Doctrine did not apply to "equal access"7 and "equal time"8 requirements imposed
I For an explanation of the "Fairness Doctrine", see infra notes 3 & 4 and
accompanying text.
2 Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 52 F.R. 31768 (1987).
3 Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 FCC2d 143, 146 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report].
4 [d.

5 S. 742, IOOth Con g., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987).
6 Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval, 23 WEEKLY
COMPo PRES. DOC. 715 (June 19, 1987).
7 47
broadcast
to permit
station by

U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)(l982) (gives the FCC the authority to revoke a
license for willful or repeated failure to allow "reasonable access to or
purchase of reasona\:tle amounts of time for the use of a broadcast
a candidate for federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy").

8 47 U.S.c. § 315 (1981) (commonly referred to as the "equal time" provision).
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by the Communications Act. 9

Thus, a broadcaster allowing a qualified candidate

for public office to "use" its airwaves must continue to afford equal opportunities
to all other opposing candida tes. 10

Remand forced the Decision

The FCC's action to invalidate the Fairness Doctrine carne in response to a
January 1987, remand order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 1 I The FCC found' that 'the Meredith Corporation's (Meredith) television
station WTYH of Syrac'use, New York, violated the Fairness Doctrine. In review of
the FCC's finding of a violation, the court held that although the FCC reasonably
interpreted

its own

consideration

to

Fairness Doctrine precedents,

Meredith's

it failed to give adequate
argument. 12 The court evaded

constitutional

constitutional review of whether the application of the Fairness Doctrine to
Meredith violated the first amendment.

Instead, the court gave the question back

to the FCC because "in a formal adjudication, an administrative agency is obliged
to consider and respond to substantial arguments a respondent presents in its
defense."13 In its 1985 Fairness Report, the FCC "deliberately cast grave legal
doubt on the Fairness Doctrine",14 so the time was ripe for the FCC to strike
down the Doctrine.
Development of the Fairness Doctrine
The

Fag.ness

Doctrine

"originated

very

early

in

the

history

of

broadcasti~g ... ." 15 'The origins of the Fairness Doctrine are usually traced to a
1929 decision of the FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission. 16

In 1949,

the FCC issued the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,17 stating the
doctrine in its present two-prong form. 18
In 1959, Congress amended Section 315 of the Communications Act 19 so that
appearances by political candidates on news broadcasts could be exempted from the
9 Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTYH, 52 F. R. 31768. The
decision also does nothing to limit the FCC's ability to license stations and
regulate them in the public interest. ld.
10 47 U.S.c. § 315 (1981).
11 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12 [d. at 865.
13 [d. at 873 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(1982».
14 Id.
15 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,369 (1969).

16 See Great Lakes Broadcasting, 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), ·rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
17 13 FCC 1246 (1949) [hereinafter Report on Editorializing].

18 See infra text accompanying notes 3 & 4.
19 47 U.S.c. § 315(a) (1981).
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"equal time" rule.

The amendment also included this language: "nothing [in this

section] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, ... , from the obligation imposed
upon

them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford

reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance.,,20
Whether this amendment codified the Fairness Doctrine such that the FCC
could not modify or eliminate the doctrine without approval from Congress is a
matter of debate. 21 The Supreme Court stated that the 1959 amendment "ratified"
the Fairness Doctrine. 22

The D.C. Circuit in Meredith also sidestepped the issue.

The court pointed out that
the Commission [in its 1985 Fairness Report] refused to decide whether
the Fairness Doctrine was self-generated pursuant to its general
congressional authorization or specifically mandated by Congress.... We
think, however, the Commission was obliged to resolve that issue, at
least in the context of an enforcement proceeding in which a party
raises a constitutional defense. 23
The fact that the FCC ruled on August 4, 1987, that the Fairness Doctrine violated
the

first

amendment

rights

of

broadcasters

indicates

Communications Act does not codify Fairness Doctrine.

that

perhaps

the

The answer to the

codification issue remains elusive.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion

Broadcasting v. FCC.24

The Court held that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and

listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."25 The Court
justified its conclusion in light of the limited availability of broadcast frequencies,
reasoning that the Fairness Doctrine's restrictions on broadcasters' freedom of
speech were permissible because the first amendment right to be informed is
crucial. 26 The Court in Red Lion left open the door for future challenges, noting
that "if experience with the administration of these doctrines indicates that they
have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of
coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider constitutional implications."27
Although the Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion on the
basis of scarcity of broadcast frequencies, it has declined to apply the Fairness
Doctrine to newspaper publishing. 28 In Miami Herald, the Court struck down
Florida's "right of reply" statute granting a political candidate a right to equal
20

1d.

21 Krattenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today:
A Constitutional
Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 153 n. 14 (1985).
22 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
23 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 873 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
24 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
25 Id. at 389.
26 Id. at 389-390.

27 Id. at 393.

28 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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space to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, free of
charge. The Court ignored the argument that "[tlhe First Amendment interest of
the public in being informed is said to be in peril because the 'marketplace of
ideas' is today a monopoly controlled by owners of the market"29 and concluded
that
[tlhe choice of materials to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time. 30
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,31 the Supreme Court held that

neither the Communications Act nor the first amendment requires broadcasters to
accept paid editorial advertisements.
that

"[ulnlike

other

media,

In that opinion, Justice White pointed out

broadcasting

is subject

to

an

inherent

physical

limitation .... Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public
resource, there is also present an unusual order of First Amendment values.,,32
The Supreme Court again affirmed the Fairness Doctrine but noted that "the
broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate
a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be
outmoded ten years hence."33

Again the Court left some flexibility in the area of

broadcast regulations, tying substance of regulations to technological change.
More recently, in FCC v. League 0/ Women Voters 0/ Cali/ornia,34 the Court
declined to reconsider Red Lion ·without some signal from Congress or the FCC
that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the
system of broadcast regulation may be required."35

The FCC's 1985 Fairness

Report certainly endeavored to send the Supreme Court the signal invited in
League 0/ Women Voters. 36 Because of the explosive growth of information
sources,

the

1985 Fairness

Report

found

the "scarcity

rationale,"

which has
historically justified content regulation of broadcasting, no longer valid. 37 The

FCC concluded that "[wlere the balance ours alone to strike, the Fairness Doctrine
would ... fall

short

of

promoting

those

interests

necessary

to

uphold

its

29 [d. at 251.

30 [d. at 258.

31 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
32 [d. at 101.
33 [d. at 102. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed Red Lion in CBS v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (holding that § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act
creates a limited right to "reasonable" access that pertains only to legally qualified
federal candidates and may be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing
their candidacies once a campaign has commenced.)
34 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
35 [d. at 376-377 n.11.
36 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d at 867.
37 [d. at 867.
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consti tu tiona Ii ty .• 38

Factors Weighing on the Constitutional Balance
In analyzing the legal and philosophical shift in perception of first amendment
rights

involved

in

broadcasting,

the

climate

of deregulation

in

the

Reagan

administration, assumptions concerning modern broadcasting technology, and the
text of the Doctrine itself must be considered. Often, as with the Fairness
Doctrine issue, overruling a legal principle on the grounds that it is contrary to
public

interest

after

longstanding,

explicit

acceptance

reflects

a

pragmatic

realization on the part of the Court that a particular policy may be unworkable or
undesirable on extra-constitutional grounds.

Regulatory Environment
A

trend

proponents,

toward deregulation

deregulation

marks the Reagan era.

sweeps away

anachronistic,

According to its

harmful

restrictions

that

interfere with the ebb and flow of markets. In the context of businesses providing
information to the public, the requirement of fair presentation of important issues
was judged, in Syracuse Peace Council, to promote "excessive and unnecessary
government intervention into the editorial processes of broadcast journalists."39
"Excessive intervention" was defined by the standard set in F.C.C. v. League

0/ Women Voters;40 the Court ruled that regulation of broadcasters' speech must
be

"narrowly

tailored

to

achieve

a

substantial

government

interest."41

The

"substantial government interest" test as applied in Syracuse Peace Council suggests
that "government interest" will now be closely associated with legitimizing the
broadcasters' privileges as rights, rather than defending the public's desire to be
heard and to remain informed.
However, regulation of the

broadcast industry, despite all its attendant

burdens and costs, may be justifiable because of the especially sensitive effect the
presentation of news has on the process of democracy, and the important first
amendment values embodied in the Doctrine which override pragmatic concerns
about "excessive intervention" and economic efficiency.
Modern Broadcast Technology
Opponents of the overturned Doctrine suggest that even if the goal of
protecting the public's right to information has merit in the abstract, government
involvement has become superfluous in light of current technology, as was argued
in the 1985 Fairness Report. With the increasing penetration of cable television in
its one hundred channel capacity, the possibility for all opinions to be aired is
effectively

limitless.

However,

cable

serves

fewer

than

50%

of

all

U.S.

38 1985 Fairness Report, 102 FCC 2d 143, 156 (1985).
39 Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 52 F.R. 31768 (1987).
40 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
41 [d. at 380.
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households. 42

Furthermore, cable requires additional payment over and above the

indirect costs of advertising borne by the consumers of over-the-air stations,
which further restricts its potential availability to the general public.
With only one topic featured on many of the cable channels, programming can
now

be

easily

directed

to

a

particularly

desired

audience.

This

audience

fragmentation serves to frustrate the public interest in obtaining a common ground
to discuss issues of importance to all kinds of viewers. Devotees of serious news
have several channels catering to them, but the limited availability and extra cost
arguments minimize these outlets as the solution to the public's need for a balance
of biases in the portrayal of issues.
The meaning of an "overall balance" in the presentation of controversial
issues has shifted over time from the ideal of balance within each station's
programming to a more general notion of balance in all media taken together.

In

the Miami Herald case, the Court refused to regulate for a balanced approach of
all media taken together, citing editorial discretion as the important value to be
promulgated, regardless of the impact on the type of information publicly available.
Although viewers and listeners may theoretically have the option of pleading their
views on a plethora of stations, and in print as well as over the air, the number
of

stations

that

will

actively

seek

or

welcome

material

associated

with

controversial issues will only decline in the aftermath of the elimination of the
Fairness Doctrine.
One leading economic rationale justifies government interference on the
grounds that competition in the marketplace has failed to provide a necessary or
desirable social good. Broadcasters, especially when the issue is the media itself, as
a whole have an incentive for preventing the airing of certain viewpoints and
issues in their entirety, thus removing a valuable social good. If broadcasters
present a monolithic front and universally declare the issue unimportant or not
controversial

enough

to

warrant

broadcast

time,

the

technologically-increased
number of stations theoretically available to the public makes no diffe·rence. 43

While technology might have changed ·since the Red Lion decision, the greater
number of media outlets may have merely amplified the strength of the media in
resisting its duties rather than providing more of the public an opportunity to gain
a hearing.
Efficacy of Enforcement In Light of the Text
The text of the Fairness Doctrine posed a large part of the difficulty in
effectively guaranteeing a first amendment atmosphere to the public. Because its
provisions were so broad, and thus open to widely differing interpretation, the
Doctrine was consistently attacked in its application as an arbitrary vehicle for
enforcement, useful only in situations of flagrant and chronic violations on major
channels.

The Syracuse Peace Council decision illustrates the difficulty the FCC

had in enforcing the Doctrine in a fair and predictable manner.

The FCC simply

does not have the resources available to pursue every possible infraction with the
42 Ferris & Kirkland, Fairness-The Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CA TH.
U.L. REV. 605 (1985) [hereinafter Hippocratic Oath].

43 See supra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text.
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same degree of intensity.

The vagueness of the first provision of the Doctrine,

the "reasonable percentage of time" obligation, could be seen as promoting a
general positive value for society, rather than a strict guideline with corresponding
penalties for violation.
General industry criticism of the low percentage of Fairness complaints
affirmed by the FCC cites inadequacy of resources as the reason behind agency
ineffecti.veness in carrying out its Fairness goals.

Often, the FCC could only truly

oversee the major television networks and radio stations in large cities, and
broadcasters in smaller communities escaped their obligations since violations were
less likely to attract the attention of an national organization like the FCC.

This

limited enforcement reveals Fairness complaints as vehicles for vocal minorities to
pursue their private agendas and impose their views on the public.
The efficacy-of -enforcement question has narrowed the first amendment by
limiting affirmative, as well as defensive, actions in support of free speech. If
broadcasters fail to present a controversial issue for comment, the supporters of
the Doctrine feel that the community as a whole is harmed.

But this harm is more

difficult to prove than in a case where a group or an individual is prohibited from
speaking out. The criteria used to define a

controversial issue for Fairness

Doctrine

attack

purposes

are

always

susceptible

to

as

reflecting

biases

of

regulators or broadcasters. Broadcasters know that once a controversial issue is put
forward and the "balance" obligation is triggered, the record of the station in
presenting both sides is not difficult to check, as in the case of a "defensive" first
amendment claim.

Although the Doctrine does not require "equal time" be given to

both sides, "overall balance" of programming remains a matter of public record in
station logs, allowing obviously inequitable presentations to be easily discovered, if
indeed the FCC is equipped to monitor them.
By no means has the federal government relinquished control over the content
of the airwaves.
time",

"equal

Because the Syracuse Peace Council did not overturn the "equal
access"

and

licensing

requirements

for

political

candidates,

government retains the ability to prevent media manipulation of vital facts. The
FCC's

opinion

signals

in

part

a

concession

to

the

current

atmosphere

of

deregulation, but mainly reflects a concern with breadth of the Doctrine's actual
text.

Regardless of how worthy its purpose, a regulation cannot function as law

without reliable and cost-effective means for enforcement.
Conclusion
If the text of the Doctrine was insufficient to safeguard the public's right to
be informed and to inform, a choice must be made between promoting these goals
through education and interest group action, or by government regulation.

Action

in the remainder of the decade will be slow due to the pervasive atmosphere of
deregulation, but perhaps a "fairer" doctrine could be developed which would
recognize the essential nature of information flowing to the public without entirely
defeating the interests of broadcasters in remaining autonomous
In the absence of new regulations, the standard requiring stations to devote a
reasonable amount of time to controversial issues should be promoted by the
stations as an industry ethic to accomplish fair representation of opposing views.
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Likewise, the now-defunct "controversial" requirement ought to force stations to
air timely issues at regular intervals, with formal opportunities for public input.
The philosophy behind the Fairness Doctrine is applauded by all, with the
understandable exception of some station owners.
to the public in return for their licenses.

Broadcasters clearly owe duties

However, delineating these duties

without hamstringing television and radio stations in the daily conduct of their
business requires more definitive statements of policy than those contained in the
version of the Fairness Doctrine overturned in August. Finding an appropriate way
to

articulate

our

shared

concerns

for

first

amendment

protections

in

the

broadcasting industry is the task facing the public, the industry, and government
alike.
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RECOVER Y FOR ASBESTOS ABATEMENT PROGRAMS:
A THEORY OF RECOVERY FOR MUNICIPALITIES
by
James T. Vitelli
Knowledge of the severe health risks posed by exposure to asbestos is
creating a

variety of new legal challenges, some of which have yet to be

conclusively litigated.

Courts and commentators have given their attention to the

liability of asbestos manufacturers for exposing workers to harmful products. This
article will focus on a different form of litigation: recovery by a municipality
against a manufacturer for expenditures made to abate the health risks generated
by asbestos used in the construction of municipal buildings.
Recovery of this sort requires an altogether different theory of liability
because no personal injury is alleged.

As most of the health concerns with respect

to asbestos in municipal buildings stem from exposure to the material by children
in public schools, this paper concentrates its analysis on abatement procedures and
recovery as they relate to the municipality's school system, although the theory of
recovery applies with equal strength to public libraries, city halls, and other public
buildings.

For the purposes of analysis, we will assume that the municipality

referred to in this article is located in a jurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code and section 402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts.
BACKGROUND
From the mid-1940's to the mid-1970's contractors used asbestos-containing
materials (ACM) in school buildings for fireproofing and insulation) Becasue of
its industrially advantageous qualities 2, asbestos was widely used in cement
products,

plaster, fireproof

textiles, vinyl floor tiles, thermal and acoustical
insulation and sprayed materials. 3 The hard asbestos-containing materials such as
vinyl floors

are generally safe and produce few, if any exposure problems.

However, soft or loosely bound materials, known as friable asbestos, pose serious
risks of contamination and exposure-related health problems. 4 Friable materials
crumble and fray easily, releasing asbestos dust and fibers into the air from which
they can be inhaled and trapped in the respiratory system.
Asbestos Related Health Risks
I Lang, The Problem oj Asbestos in the Public Schools, 16
Q. 13 (No.2 1984) [hereinafter Asbestos in Public Schools].

TRIAL LAW.

2 Jd.
These qualities include fire resistance, tensile strength, and above
average thermal and electrical insulating capabilities.

3

Jd.

4 Office of Toxic Substances, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Guidance Jor
2-1
(1983)
Controlling
Friable
Asbestos-Containing Materials
in
Buildings
[hereinafter Friable Asbestos], as cited in Lang, Asbestos in Public Schools at 13 n.5.
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Among the serious medical disorders ·associated with exposure to asbestos are:
asbestosis, a lung disease; mesothelioma, a rare cancer of the chest and abdominal
lining; and cancers of the lung, esophagus, stomach, colon and other organs. 5
School age children face particularly severe problems because of the diseases' longterm manifestation period. 6 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates
that a child exposed to asbestos between the ages of five and ten has at least ten
times greater chance of contracting mesothelioma than does an adult between the
ages of thirty-five and forty.1

In addition to these findings by the EPA, Congress

. released its own conclusions regarding the health risks presented to school children
exposed

to

asbestos

products.

Section 4011

of the

Asbestos School

Hazard

Abatement Act of 1984,8 now incorporated into Title 20, reads in part:
(a) The Congress finds that -(I) exposure to asbestos fibers has been identified over long period of
time by reputable medical and scientific evidence as significantly
increasing the incidence of cancer and other severe fatal diseases, such
as asbestosis;
(2) medical evidence has suggested that children may be particularly
vulnerable to environmentally induced cancers; ...
(4) substantial amounts of asbestos, particularly in sprayed form, have
been used in school buildings, especially during the period 1946 through
1972;
(5) partial surveys in some States have indicated that (A) in a number
of school buildings materials containing asbestos fibers became damaged
or friable, causing asbestos fibers to be dislodged into the air, and (B)
asbestos concentration
far exceeding normal ambient air levels have been found in school
buildings containing such damaged materials;

(6) the presence in school buildings of friable or easily damaged
asbestos creates an unwarranted hazard to the health of school children
and school employees who are exposed to such material .... 9
In addition to agency and congressional recognition of the health hazards
created by exposure to asbestos, courts have also acknowledged the dangers.

A

federal district court in Minnesota held, when presented with the issue of whether
a plaintiff could collaterally estop the defendant from litigating the issue of

5 Id. at 14.
See also G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON
ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS, at BI-BII
(I980) as cited in Kincade, Issues in School Asbestos Hazard Abatement Litigation,
16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 951, 954 n.1I (1985).
6 See Lang, Asbestos in Public Schools, at 14, "As contrasted with asbestos
workers, school age children have a significantly greater lifetime 'risk in developing
mesothelioma because of the age at which asbestos exposure occurs." Id. at 14 n.I3.

7 The 1983 EPA Study (Friable Asbestos) at 1-2, as cited in Lang, Asbestos
in Public Schools at 14 n.15.
8

20 U.S.C.A. § 4011-4021 (West Supp. 1987).

9

20 U.S.C.A. § 4011 (West Supp. 1987), (emphasis

t02

added).

disease causation, that the fact that asbestos causes diseases such as asbestosis
and mesothelioma was so firmly entrenched in medical and legal literature that it
was not subject to serious dispute. IO This universal recognition of the health
hazards presented by asbestos products to school children and teachers has caused
federal and state agencies to develop mandatory asbestos abatement procedures.
The Process of Asbestos Abatement
In May, 1982, the EPA promulgated a rule requiring "local education agencies
to identify friable asbestos-containing material in public and private schools by
visually inspecting. schools buildings for friable materials....'oIl

This rule also

requires "local education agencies to provide warnings of the health effects of
asbestos and

instructions on methods to avoid or reduce exposure to school

employees of any school with friable asbestos-containing material and to notify
parent-teacher associations of the results of inspections."12

Though the rule

requires detection and warning, the EPA did not require abatement or offer any
guidelines if this course of action was pursued. 13 As a result, school districts
have taken it upon themselves to abate the hazardous materials.
voluntary

abatement,

some

states

have

implemented

In addition to

mandatory

abatement

procedures upon the discovery of ACM 14 The procedures often include:
I) total removal, the most costly yet most permanent remedy;
2) enclosure, or the construction of an air tight barrier around the ACM; and

3) encapsulation, or the coating of the ACM to prevent fiber and dust
release. r5
10 Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn.
1982). Action brought against manufacturer and seller of asbestos products by
asbestos insulation installer. The issue was whether the plaintiff could collaterally
estop the defendants from litigating certain issues. The court held that on the
issue of disease causation estoppel was appropriate as the fact that asbestos dust
causes disease is a fact so firmly established that it is not worthy of relitigation.

II

See 40 C.F.R. § 763.100 (1985).

12

Id.

13 See Kincade, Issues in School Asbestos Hazard Abatement Litigation, 16
ST. MARY'S L.J. 951, 955 (1985) [hereinafter: Kincade, Issues).

14 See e.g. 1985 Conn. Pub. Acts 541. Section 2 of that act states: "Each
school district shall inspect its school facilities for asbestos and submit a report of
its findings along with an abatement plan ... ." (emphasis added).

15 Kincade, Issues at 955 n.15. See also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-_-1:
Definitions.
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Abatement procedures are expensive l6 and many municipalities are unable to
bear the entire financial burden absent outside assistance.

The Asbestos School

Hazard Abatement Act of 1984 provides for financial assistance through an
"Assistance Program."17

Like many other federally funded assistance programs, the

granting of aid is premised on financial need.
states in pertinent part:

Subsection (d) of section 4014

"In no event shall financial assistance be provided under

this chapter to an applicant if the Administrator determines that such applicant
has resources adequate to support an appropriate asbestos materials abatement
program."18

Thus, financially needy school districts are entitled to a 20 year
interest free loan of up to one hundred percent of the cost of abatement. 19 If
the Administrator finds that the district will be unable to perform the necessary
abatement through a loan, a grant may be given in an amount of up to fifty
percent of the cost of abatement. 20
Districts with "adequate resources" must
initiate abatement procedures absent any federal assistance.
Such financial assistance helps to get abatement programs off the ground, but
is ineffective as a complete remedy because school districts must, over a twenty
year period, find some way to pay the government back.

This would necessarily

entail drastic long-term budget cuts, resulting in the loss of current school
programs, teachers, supplies and extracurricular activities.

For districts receiving

no financial assistance, this remedy mandates immediate budget cuts.

A further

pitfall of the federal funding remedy is that the fulfillment of the promise of
forthcoming money is te~uous at best. 21
to

reliance

on

federal

funding

manufacturers to recover for

is

The most direct and promising alternative
direct

tort

litigation

damage caused by the

with

the

asbestos

unreasonably dangerous

product.
Establishing Manufacturer Liability
The most promising and complete theory upon which manufacturer liability
can be established is a strict products liability theory under section 402A of the
Restatement 2d, Torts. That sections reads:

16 See City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559, 570 (D.
S.C. 1986). Abatement costs for City Hall clean-up totaled $4,809,000.00.
17

20 U.S.C.A. § 4041 (West Supp. 1987).

18

Id. at § 4014 (d).

19

[d. at § 4014 (e)(I), (f)(2).

20

Id. at § 4014 (e)(I).

21 Kincade, Issues at 956 n.18. In addition to being speculative, federal
funds cause other problems as well. "In hearings before the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce, John A. Moore, EPA
assistant administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, testified that the Act
is 'likely to be counter-productive because school districts would begin competing
for the federal funds instead of moving quickly on their own.'" Id.
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Special Liability of Seller of Product For Physical Harm to
Consumer

User or

(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer in which it
is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his prod ucts, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
For a municipality to recover under this section, it must establish a defect in the
product, a causal link between this defect and the injury to the user or his
product, and the manufacturer's knowledge that the product would reach the user
without substantial change in condition. 22 We may assume that the last element,
change in condition, is unchallenged where there is no claim of product tampering
or alteration.

The first two elements however, defect and causal link, are fiercely

contested issues in asbestos litigation.
Manufacturer's Duty to Warn
Comment (j) of the Restatement requires the seller to warn of a danger of
which it has knowledge, or "by the application of reasonable, developed human skill
and

foresight

should

have

knowledge ... ."23

This

requirement

that

the

manufacturers warn if it had or should have had knowledge of the danger"ous
conditions presents many problems for municipal plaintiffs. Defendants offer their
lack of knowledge at the time of sale as the "state of the art" defense.

If there

was no way for manufacturers to know of the product hazard at the time of sale,
then section 402A cannot apply and the manufacturers are absolved. 24
The applicability of comment j to asbestos cases is subject to dispute. 25
Recent court decisions addressing the issue have rejected the state of the art
defense,26 opining that its knowledge and foreseeability analysis "equates the
22
(1983).

See Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 885-86

23

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).

24

Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, at 886.

25

Id.

26 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982) and Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
But see Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982), "strict
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failure to warn standard applied under strict liability with that applied under a
negligence theory, thus removing the distinctions between the two causes of
action.,,27
In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., a suit brought by individuals
who contracted asbestos-related diseases from their exposure to friable asbestos,
the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to permit the defendant to assert the state
of the art defense, holding that if the product is in fact dangerous, the knowledge
of such danger is implied to the defendants. 28 In so holding, the Court stressed
that any further application of a duty to warn based on then-existing knowledge
would remove the distinction between strict liability and negligence. 29

The Court

stated "that if a product was in fact defective, the distribution of the product
should compensate its victims for the misfortune that is inflicted on them.,,30
In Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., an action involving the same issue as

Beshada, the district court held that the defendants could not avail themselves of
the state the art defense: 31
Evidence relating to the state of the art at the time of manufacture is
relevant only to the issue of due care in the manufacturing process, a
negligence concept not at issue in this strict liability action.... Regardless of
what was reasonably foreseeable to the defendants at the time of
manufacture, asbestos products should have been accompanied by adequate
warnings; the nature of this strict liability action makes the defendants' state
of knowledge at the time of manufacture irrelevant.
The J:!roduct and
warnings attachec;! thereto are in issue, not the defendants' conduct. 32
However, two years later, the 5th Circuit, in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales

Corp., though not explicitly overruling Flatt, held that "strict liability because of
failure to warn is based on a determination of the manufacturer's reasonable
knowledge."33

This statement would appear to reinstate the state of the art

defense, because reasonable knowledge at the time of sale is relevant to establish
liability because of failure to warn is based on determination of the manufacturer's
reasonable knowledge" at 344.
27

Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation at 886.

28

90 N.J. 191,447 A.2d 539, 543 (1982).

29

447 A.2d at 546.

30

Id.

31

488 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Tex. 1980).

32

Id. at 841-42.

33

681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir. 1982).
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whether the defendant breached a duty by failing to warn.
The approach taken by the courts which eliminate the state of the art
defense is the wiser analysis.

Comment (a) of section 402A purports to "make the

seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of the product."34

The care required in

the sale of the product should include marketing and warnings.

The knowledge

and foreseeability element of comment (j) should be removed from all products
liability action, not just asbestos cases.
If neither party is aware of the risks, the party best able to bear them
should be forced to do so, because consumers are incapable of paying the high
costs which the risks impose, especially when the consumer is a municipality with
a tight fixed budget.

Manufacturers on the other hand need only increase the

price of their products a small percentage to meet the increase in insurance
premiums which are inevitable if strict liability is applied in the strictest sense,
without regard to knowledge and foreseeability.
Placement of liability on manufacturers, regardless of what they knew at the
time of sale would encourage more testing and research of new products prior to
marketing if the new product will expose the consumers to unwarranted danger. 35
More expansive safety research will advance the policy of accident avoidance while
not stifling technological advancements.
Actual Notice
If the state of the art defense is not abolished, plaintiffs must be prepared to
prove that manufacturers in fact had knowledge sufficient to require warnings
regarding asbestos related hazards.

In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,

the Court held that "a seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that
are reasonably foreseeable.

The requirement of foreseeability coincides with the

standard of due care in negligence cases in that a seller must exercise reasonable
care and foresight to discover a danger in his product and to warn users and

consumers of that danger.,,36

Despite this rule which favors the defendants much

more than the Beshada approach, the court still found the defendants liable for
failure to warn. 37
In Borel, the defendants argued that the danger from inhaling asbestos was
not foreseeable until "about 1968."38
34
added).

The Court held that the jury, relying on

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment (a) (1965) (emphasis

35 "By imposing on manufacterurs the cost of failure to discover hazards, we
create an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research." Beshada,
447 A.2d at 548.
36 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)(emphasis added).

37

[d. at 1093.

38

[d. at 1092.

107

expert witness testimony, could find that the danger of inhaling asbestos was
recognized as early as the 1930's.39

One witness, Dr. Hans Weill, testified that

"prior to 1935 there were literally dozens and dozens of articles on asbestos and
its effects on man."40

A plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Clark Cooper, stated that

"it was known in the 1930's that inhaling asbestos dust caused asbestosis 41 and
that the danger could be controlled by maintaining a modest level of exposure."42
The Court cited findings by the American Conference bf Governmental Industrial
Hygienists which in 1947 issued guidelines "suggesting 1hreshold limit values for
exposure to asbestos dust."43

A 1947 report relied on by the plaintiffs warned of
respiratory diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos dust. 44
After considering all of this evidence, the Court held that "once the danger
became foreseeable, the duty to warn attached."45

Even the lenient application of

the strict liability analysis resulted in a finding of manufacturer liability.

If

municipal plaintiffs can effectively utilize this and similar testimony, the state of
the art defense will fail, to the extent that plaintiffs can establish that the state
of the art throughout the period of installation included the knowledge of serious
health risks.

Knowledge of the Dangers of Low Level Radiation
The next obstacle which municipal plaintiffs face is the fact that all prior
litigation concerning the knowledge of health risks focused on high levels of
exposure. The issue which
is "firmly entrenched in the medical and legal literature" such that it is "not
subject to serious dispute"46 is that high levels of 'q<;cupational asbestos exposure
causes severe health risks.

If lower levels associated
, with exposure to school

children do not pose similar risks, the fact that the state of the art defense is
abolished or strictly applied will be of no consequence.

If school children and

municipal workers face no health risks, then the ;'.asbestos is not unreasonably
dangerous with respect to municipal plaintiffs.

Despite the congressional findings

that asbestos in schools presents a risk of harm to children,47 the defendants are
free to litigate the risk of this harm as such findings do not affect the legal
39

[d.

40

[d.

41

[d.

42

[d. at 1092-93.

43

[d. at 1093.

44

[d.

45

[d. at 1089.

46

Bertrand, 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982).

47

See supra note II and accompanying text.
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rights of any party.48
In jurisdictions abolishing the state of the art defense, defendants will argue
that knowledge of the danger is imputed to them if and only if there is actual
danger.

If low levels of exposure are in fact harmless, there can be no liability.

In jurisdictions employing the state of the art defense, defendants can argue that
the knowledge in the 1930's and 1940's of risks posed by high level exposure did
not constitute knowledge of risks present in low level exposure situations.
To overcome this problem, plaintiffs must propose jury instructions which
allow juries to impute the knowledge of asbestos hazards in high level situations to
those involving lower level. In Kar jala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the court
upheld such an instruction. 49 The Eighth Circuit approved an instruction which
informed the jury that factory workers risked disease due to asbestos exposure,
and that knowledge of this risk was known to the manufacturer at least as early
as 1942. 50 Though the plaintiff was an installation worker and not a factory
worker, thus subject to lower levels of exposure, it was for the jury to decide
whether the knowledge with respect to factory workers put the defendant on
notice of the danger to the plaintiff in his capacity as an installation worker. 51
Similarly, municipal plaintiffs may argue that the known hazards associated with
occupational exposure created a duty to warn due to the foreseeability of health
risks in non-occupational settings. 52
Given the knowledge of the risks available in the
reinforcement of that knowledge in the 1950's and 60's,53

1930's and 40's, the
and the knowledge of

the manufacturers that millions of people would come in contact with their
products, it is not unreasonable to find, as a matter of law, that a risk exists,
that it was realized at the time of sale, and that warnings were required.

The

only alternative - waiting twenty or so years to determine if, in fact, low level
exposure is harmful - is unreasonable as this would create a disincentive for
municipalities to take corrective action, thereby exposing many more children to
the potentially harmful product while the manifestation period runs.
Suppression of Information
Another

argument

which

plaintiffs

may

advance

to

establish

that

manufacturers should have known about risks posed by low level exposure is that
the suppression of medical findings severely limited the public's knowledge of the
48

20 V.S.C.A. §4019 (West Supp. 1987).

49

523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975).

50

Id. at 158.

51

Id.

52

See Kincade, Issues at 960.

53

See Motley, The Lid Comes Off, 16 TRIAL, April, 1980, at 21.
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hazards, and consequently stifled further testing which may have revealed the
extent of the risks involved.
According to one commentator, the president of Raybestos-Manhattan in 1935
denied permission to the editor of Asbestos, a trade journal, to print the results of
a British study documenting the occupational hazard of asbestos dust inhalation. 54
President Simpson later thanked the editor for following the directive, stating:
"the

less

said

about

asbestos,

the

better

off

we

are ... .',55

Johns-Manville

maintained a policy of withholding the confirmed diagnosis of asbestosis from its
workers while they were still able to work lest they "become mentally and
physically

ill,

Workers with

simply

through

the

knowledge

that

[they

have)

asbestosis."56

the disease were denied treatment and were forced

to suffer

continued exposure to the very mineral causing their disease, as knowledge of such
disease might result in depression at home and on the job.
Had the extensive nature of asbestos-related diseases been publicized during
the 1930's and 40's, further studies could have and probably would have been
performed.

These studies could have resulted in findings that low level exposure

situations pose a substantial risk of health problems.

Because of the industrial

cover-up, the risk of low level exposure remains speculative.

The manufacturers

should not be permitted to use this speculation as a defense in light of the fact
that the lack of conclusive evidence pertaining to low level situations was a direct
result of their misconduct.
Proving the Injury
Having established that the defendants knew or should have known about a
hazardous condition that causes injury, the plaintiff's final element of proof is that
the product in fact caused such injury.

As stated above, the 'municipality as

plaintiff' case is unique in that there is admittedly no personal injury. In order to
recover, the plaintiff must establish physical injury to the consumer's property.

If

no physical injury is established, section 402A will not apply and the plaintiff will
be limited to contract recovery for damages contemplated by the parties at the
time of forming the contract. 57
Physical Injury or Economic Loss
What the plaintiff actually seeks is the cost to remove and replace the
defective product.
54

[d.

55

[d. at 22.

56

[d. at 24.

Such causes of action are usually defined as actions for

57 See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. Ch. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, _
(1854). "Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages ... ought [to be). .. such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it."
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economic loss,58 and are usually decided under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).

"The [UCC] is generally regarded as the exclusive source for ascertaining

when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is based on intangible
economic loss not attributable to physical injury to person or harm to a tangible
thing other than the defective product itself."59
The defendant will assert that the UCC precludes a strict liability recovery,
as the dangerous condition of asbestos results only in deterioration of the product
itself and causes no personal or physical injury.

"When the defect causes an

accident 'involving some violence or collision with external objects' the resulting
loss is treated as property damage.
product results from

deterioration,

On the other hand, when the damage to the
internal breakage or other non-accidental

causes, it is treated as economic loss.,,60

To counter these assertions, the plaintiff

must establish that the dangerous condition caused by the presence of asbestos
does produce a collision, thereby satisfying the physical injury requirement of
section 402A.
Although no reported decision has couched the asbestos cause of action in
such terms, the physical injury necessary for tort recovery can be cast as having
arisen from "some violence or collision with an external object.,,61
can result in one of two ways.

This collision

First, the presence of the ACM creates an

inevitable collision between the building itself and the municipality's effort to
remove it.

In other words, "the physical act of ripping out and tearing away the

asbestos material from other parts of the school building reflects damage to
property other than the product itself."62

The second form of collision is that

which occurs when the friable asbestos fibers and dust break away from the
product and land on other parts of the building and its occupants.

Though these

particles may be invisible and float through the air like feathers, their impact is
significant.
A recent decision by the Alaska Supreme Court provides insightful, though
not binding, support to the first theory of collision. 63

In Shooshanian v. Wagner,

the Court held that where plaintiff sought costs for tearing out inner walls of its
building in order to reach and remove noxious insulation, a cause of action in

58

See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM

L. REV. 917 (I 966).

59 See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A, at 680
(5th ed. 1984).
60 Note, Economic Loss at 918 (quoting Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157
Cal. App. 2d 863, 866, 323 P.2d 277, 229 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't. 1958» (emphasis added).
61

The collision test is discussed in Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, supra note

62

Kincade, Issues at 970.

63

672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983).

60.

III

strict products liability could be maintained. 64 The plaintiffs had no choice but to
pursue procedures which would alter their living and working environment. Though
the Court did not use 'collision' language, it can be applied without great strain.
Alteration of the environment was necessary to abate the hazard.

It created an

inevitable collision in the form of tearing up the walls and ceilings, and no one
would deny that this constitutes physical damage.

As long as the defendant's

conduct made this damage necessary, an action should lie.
In an analogous situation, a defendant is liable for trespass if, without
entering the land of another, he forces a third person onto the plaintiff's land, or
coerces him to enter through fear or false representations. 65 The defendant's act
caused the harm, and liability is established.

In the asbestos case, the defendant's

manufacture of a hazardous product and his failure to warn caused the plaintiff to
harm his own building. This resulting harm should be charged to the defendant.
The second collision theory does not appear to have much (if any) reported
precedent, although a recent unpublished opinion from the District Court of South
Carolina indicates that such a theory is viable. 66 In City 0/ Greenville v. W.R.

Grace & Co., the district court, though not using the term 'collision,' held that
where asbestos fibers broke away and landed on other parts of the building, the
building had suffered physical damage. 67
In an action to recover asbestos
abatement costs incurred in cleansing Greenville's City Hall, the jury found that
asbestos materials were falling off the infrastructure beams and landing on ceiling
tiles.

City experts tested for the presence of fibers and found "invisible asbestos

fibers on every building surface tested in amounts of up to millions of fibers per
square foot of surface area."68 Asbestos contaminated both carpets and ceiling
tiles as well. 69
The Court's consistent use of the terms 'contamination,' and
'landed' reconcile the asbestos deterioration with the need to find an accident or
collision.

Each fiber-causing contamination is the result of a. collision between the

fiber and'the building, this collision producing a danger of harm to the building's
occupants.

Such contamination caused by the landing fibers is sufficient to create

a physical injury aside from mere deterioration or other economic loss.
Summary of Cause of Action
To establish manufacturer liability, the municipal plaintiff should move to
64

!d. at 464.

65

See PROSSER & KEETON at 72-3.

66

City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986).

67

[d. at 7.

68

[d. at 3.

69

[d.
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strike the state of the art defense as it does not comply with a strict liability
theory.

If this effort is unsuccessful, the plaintiff must establish actual knowledge

on the part of the manufacturer at the time of sale sufficient to require a
warning.

This may be done either by imputing the existing knowledge concerning

high level risk situations to low level exposure situations or by establishing that
the lack of risk awareness at the time of sale was due to the defendant's own
misconduct in suppressing information.
Finally, the plaintiff must establish a physical injury in order to avoid UCC
limitations.

This can be accomplished by demonstrating the physical injury to the

building through a collision theory.

One form of collision occurs when the

plaintiff tears apart the building to gain access to the ACM

The second form of

coli is ion occurs when the asbestos fibers break away and contaminate the building.
Conclusion
The flexibility of progressive courts in dealing with the issue of foreseeability
and physical harm should enable municipal plaintiffs to establish valid causes of
action under section 402A of the Restatement. This will enable these plaintiffs to
recover the expenses of abatement procedures from manufacturers instead of
bearing the burden themselves.

Establishing manufacturer liability will enable

municipalities to continue operation without cutting valuable services such as
education, police protection, fire prevention, and road/sewer maintenance. This
liability also comports with the policy of making society pay the expenses of
technology a little at a time, instead of forcing individual victims to pay in large
lump sums.

ASBESTOS UPDATE
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the judgment in City

0/ Greenville v. W.R. Grace

& Co., 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986), holding that the

company knew of the danger from their product and that the product was
defective. City 0/ Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 86-26096 (4th Cir. Sept. 4,
1987).
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in School Board v. Gypsum Co., No.
870265 (1987), denied recovery by the Norfolk School Board for the cost of
removing products containing asbestos from school buildings. Importantly, the
decision was based on the relevant statute of limitations rather than a theory of
recovery.
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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WITH A FAILED LIBEL CLAIM:
THE FAULTY LOGIC OF FALWELL V. FLYNT
by
Elizabeth M. Campbell

Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the properuse of every thing, and
in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.
It has accordingly been decided ... that it is better to leave a few of its

noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning them away, to
injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits. I
James

Madison's

remark

during

the

Constitutional

underlying principle governing the disposition of
freedom of speech issues.

debates

remains

the

cases involving first amendment

In order to protect and encourage robust public debate-

-to preserve the "marketplace of ideas"--the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the language of the first amendment liberally, placing only certain
limited categories of speech outside its purview and protection. Obscenity2, child
pornography3, and words that incite people to riot 4 are examples of speech the
Court deems unprotected.
The Court also excludes libelous speech from first amendment protection.
Generally, the legal system embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
does not favor publication of falsities that defame or harm the reputation of
others. Defamation, libel or slander is a communication that tends to harm the
reputation of someone, The harm occurs when the community lowers its estimation
of the defamed and the communication deters third persons from dealing or
associating with him. 5
Although a court finds a communication non-defamatory the plaintiff may still
suffer emotional distress from the publication.

The libel plaintiff may therefore

opt to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional or mental distress.
The mental distr~ss action protects a plaintiff's interest in his peace of
mind. 6 The courts have been slow to redress emotional injury for a number of
Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 326, 312 S.E.2d
405, 413, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (quoting 4 Elliot's Debates on the
Federal Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.)).
2

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

3

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. '747 (1982).

4

Brandenburg v. 'Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

5

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § III at 739 (4th ed. 1971).

6

[d. § 12, at 49.
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reasons.?

In recent years, however, judges have become more willing to allow
recovery under this tort. 8
Furthermore, plaintiffs are now pleading emotional
distress as well as libel in suits against the media. 9
An example of a recent suit involving both libel and infliction of emotional
distress claims is Falwell v. Flynt. IO
In Falwell, the Reverend Jerry Falwell sued
Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler Magazine.

Hustler had run an advertisement that

portrayed Falwell as engaging in a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother
in an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia.

Falwell sued Flynt under three theories:

defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
At trial in the United States District Court for the
Virginia, the jury returned a mixed verdict. I I

Western District of

While Falwell lost his libel and

invasion of privacy claims, the jury found Flynt guilty of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. It awarded Falwell $200,000 in damages for his mental pain and
suffering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this
decision. I2 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari.

Falwell raises serious questions about freedom of speech under the first
amendment.

Only a few decisions have granted emotional distress claims when a

libel claim failed. I3

Before Falwell, no court had allowed a public figure plaintiff

to receive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for a publication
which a jury found could not reasonably be interpreted as making any statements
of fact.
A court can use one of three approaches when faced with an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim accompanying a failed libel claim.

First, the

court may do as the Fourth Circuit did in Falwell and treat the two causes of
action as entirely separate and independent (the separateness approach). In these
cases a distress claim may survive the demise of plaintiff's libel claim and the
court will treat an individual's interest in injury to peace of" mind independently of
first amendment interests.

7 Id. at 50-51. Prosser cites reasons such as difficulty of proof, difficulty
in measuring damages and judicial fear of sham claims for mental injury.
8

See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956).

9
Mead, Suing Media For Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis oj
Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 35 (1983) [hereinafter Mead, Suing
Media].

10 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom., HustIer Magazine v.
Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987).
II

Falwell v. Flynt, No. 83-0155-L-R, slip op. (W.O. Va. April 16, 1985).

12

Falwell, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).

13 See Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.
1979). See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1974). In the Firestone case
it is less clear that the plaintiff's recovery was indeed for emotional distress.
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claim rise and fall with a libel claim (the contingency approach), as long as there
is a public figure or matter of public interest involved and the communication is
not conveying false statements of fact.

In these cases, first amendment concerns

will override an individual's interest in recovering for personal distress.
Third, the court, after determining that a plaintiff indeed satisfies the statutory
or common law standard for intentional infliction of severe mental distress, may
weigh that plaintiff's interest in peace of mind against the value of the speech at
issue.

The court will examine the purpose and content of the speech:

whether

the speech is informative or educational, or, whether it is merely exploitive or
entertaining. A judge determines if the first amendment interest in not
suppressing the speech is enough to overcome the public figure's interest in
recovering for mental harm.

If the speech contributes to the marketplace of ideas,

then first amendment concerns will prevail and the distress claim will die.

But, if

the court finds that the speech does not contribute to robust public debate, then
the distress claim may survive in spite of first amendment objections.
This note will examine these three approaches in light of Falwell v. Flynt 14
and related cases while considering the distress and libel causes of action and the
interests each protect.

It will suggest that the "contingency" approach holds the

most merit and suggest that first amendment protection should apply to any claim
which may damage

freedo~

of the press or freedom of speech. Allowing a plaintiff

to recover for hurt feelings as a result of an unpleasant or insulting publication
circumvents the stringent defamation requirements set forth in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan. 15 Permitting someone to bypass the requirement of proving "actual or
constitutional malice" by merely showing common law malice l6 required by the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress poses a danger to freedom of speech
and will likely chill the exercise of this constitutional right.

The central issue

addressed in this article is whether a public figure plaintiff should recover damages
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on facts
insufficient to support a cause of action for defamation when the publication in
question contains no
assertions of fact.
The Facts of Falwell v. Flynt
l7
Falwell
arose from Hustler Magazine's publication of one of a series of
advertisements for Campari liqueur that featured certain celebrities talking about
14

797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).

15

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

16 Common law malice is ill will or spite, thus meaning that motive is all
important. Constitutional or actual malice instead focuses on whether a defendant
knew her publication was false or published it with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
17 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). All of the facts in the next several pages
of text are taken from the published opinion and the two opening briefs of counsel
for Falwell and Flynt. Opening Brief for Appellant at 2-5, Flynt v. Falwell, 797
F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1417 (L) consolidated with No. 85-1480).
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their "first time."

These celebrities related their first time drinking Campari, but

the ads carried sexual connotations as well.

The ad featuring Jerry Falwell

portrayed him as intoxicated from the liqueur when his "first time" was with his
mother behind an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia.

It ad portrayed Falwell as a

drunkard and as having engaged in an incestuous relationship with his deceased
mother.
The parody appeared in the section of Hustler entitled "FICTION; Ad and
Personality Parody."

Furthermore, the ad contained a disclaimer which read "AD

PARODY--NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY."

In response, Falwell brought suit

against Hustler Magazine, Inc., publisher Larry Flynt, and
Company, Inc.

Flynt Distributing

Five months later Hustler re-published the ad in its March 1985

issue.
Falwell filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia.

He sued the three defendants alleging three causes of action:

invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

libel,

The district

court dismissed the privacy claim under Virginia state law which permits recovery
for invasion of privacy only if a plaintiff's name and likeness is used "for purposes
of trade."18

The court "barred the invasion of privacy recovery because the name

or likeness must be infected with substantial falsification and a reader must
reasonably believe the falsification.

Because the jury found the parody was not

believable, Falwell had no cognizable claim for invasion of privacy.
The jury found no reasonable person could believe that the ad parody
conveyed statements of fact about Jerry Falwell.

In order to prevail on a libel

cause of action, a public figure plaintiff must prove constitutional actual malice-that the defendant knowingly or with reckless disregard published falsities about
the plaintiff.

Because the ad was not false it could not libel the well-known

Reverend Falwell. The jury thus found for defendant Flynt on the libel claim.
The claim for emotional distress
The court then addressed the most interesting part of the case:
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
of evidence over defendant's objections.

Falwell's

The jury viewed several pieces

The jury saw a video tape of Flynt's

deposition in which he testified that he wanted to upset Falwell and to assassinate
his integrity.19
18

The District Judge also admitted into evidence prior issues of

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (\985).

19 The following is an excerpt from the deposition of Larry Flynt taken by
Falwell's counsel:
Q. Did you want to upset Reverend Falwell?
A. yes ....
Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad, you
were attempting to convey to the people who read read it that Reverend Falwell
was just as you characterized him, a liar?
A. He's a glutton.
Q. How about a liar?
A. Yeah. He's a liar, too.
Q. How about a hypocrite?
A. Yeah.
Q. That's what you wanted to convey?
A. Yeah.
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Hustler that had ridiculed Falwell.

The jury concluded that Flynt had intended to

cause Falwell emotional distress and awarded him $100,000 actual damages. The jury
also assessed $50,000 punitive damages against Flynt and $50,000 punitive damages
against Hustler.

On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit upheld the district court's ruling.

On defendant's petition for rehearing

with suggestion for rehearing en banc the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing five to
four. 20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1987.
The Evolution of the Law of Defamation
The first amendment provides "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.,,21

Some legal scholars and judges construe

this language to mean that absolutely no speech should be punishable.

Although

this sounds extreme, Justice Black conceded that when speech is accompanied by
disorderly conduct it may not be protected. 22
For those on the opposite end of the spectrum, government censorship and
content-based restrictions are a matter of course.
the views of the far right.

Consider people who espouse

They favor censoring rock music containing lyrics they

find offensive and banning school books that embody philosophies with which they
do not agree.

The history of defamation law in the United States displays a series

of movements along the spectrum between these two extremes.
The Sedition Act of 1798 made criticism of members of Congress and the

Q. And didn't it occur to you that if it wasn't true, you were attacking a
man in his profession?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote "okay" or approved this
publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood, and in his
commitment and career, he has to have an integrity that people believe in? Did
you not appreciate that?
A. Yeah.
Q. And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm it,
if you could?
A. To assassinate it.
Falwell, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986). Flynt's counsel tried desperately to
exclude the video tape from evidence on the grounds that Flynt was incompetent
because the deposition was taken while Flynt was in prison right after his leg had
been broken.
When asked, .he identified himself as Christopher Columbus
Cornwallis I.P.Q. Harvey H. Apache Pugh and claimed that the ad parody had been
written by rock stars Yoko Ono and Billy Idol. Counsel said he was at the peak
of a manic phase of a maniC-depressive psychological disorder at the time.
Opening Brief for Appellant at 5.
.
20 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub. nom., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 107 S. Ct.
1601 (1987).
21

U.S. Const. amend I.

22 Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview,
37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549 (1962). The well known example Justice Black cites is
someone shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater.
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President a crime. 23
statutes.

In addition, States once imposed strict liability defamation

The State and private plaintiffs thus had a relatively easy time in

succeeding with defamation suits.

The guarantees of the first amendment did not

became firmly embedded in our constitutional scheme until 1964 when the Supreme
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 24 . .In New York Times, the

Court handed down

Court said that a public official plaintiff, in order to win a defamation claim, must
prove that the allegedly defamatory communication "was made with actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."25

The "actual malice" standard the Court defined was a marked

departure from the common law malice standard which turned on the defendant's
whether

intent:

ill

will

or

spite

motivated

the

publication.

The

actual

malice/reckless disregard standard presents a high threshold for plaintiffs in
defamation cases.

A mere failure to investigate is not reckless disregard; rather, a

defendant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication
in order to fall under the actual malice heading. 26
In Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc .. 27 the Supreme Court distinguished between
the burden of proof on public and private figures.
Dun and Bradstreet v.
28
Greenmoss Builders
may have complicated the picture further by subjecting
matters of private concern and public concern to different standards of proof by
plaintiffs.

Depending therefore upon who the communication was about and its

subject matter, different proof requirements may apply.

The end result is that

plaintiffs have mored difficulty than ever winning libel claims. Two decisions
handed down in 1986 reaffirm the Supreme Court's commitment to first amendment

23

L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation 247 (1978).

24

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

25

Id. at 279-80.

26

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).

27 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
"Gertz established that suits ~,rought by public
officials and public figures, at least against media defendants,must always meet
the actual-malice test.
Second, all, defamation suits, even those by private
plaintiffs based on communications about nonpublic issues, must not provide for
liability unless there is a showing of fault. Third, damages may no longer be
awarded without proof of injury, although a broad range of injury is still
compensable and the proof requirements are not stringent. Finally, there must be
proof of actual malice before punitive damages may be awarded." (citations
omitted). Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law
of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. I, 10 (1983).

28 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In a suit by a private plaintiff over a matter of
private concern the Court held that the plaintiff does not have to prove reckless
disregard for the truth by defendant.

120

freedoms.

In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.,29 the Court held that a plaintiff

must provide "clear and convincing" preliminary evidence that the defendant acted
with actual malice even on a motion for summary judgement.

The Court ruled in

Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps30 that in order to receive damages for libel
a private-figure plaintiff must show that the allegedly defamatory communication
was false.

Evolution of the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
The

emotional

or

redressable injury group.

mental distress

tort

is a

relative

newcomer

to

the

Early on, courts refused to allow any sort of recovery

for mental injury unless the plaintiff had suffered some physical injury or other
objective manifestation of serious emotional distress in order to deny spurious
claims. 31
Courts came to recognize recovery for emotional distress by
piggybacking the claim on some other tort.

For instance, in

State Rubbish

Collectors Association v. Silizno!! the defendant threatened bodily harm to a
garbage man who refused to make extortion payments; plaintiff sued for assault
and mental distress and won on both counts. 32 Prosser describes these ·parasitic·
damages as a wedge in the door toward the eventual wide open independence of
the distress tort. 33
A psycholologist's testimony as to a victim's mental state
without proof of adverse physical symptoms proximately caused by stress prevented
recovery.

Judges understandably are wary of sham claims of emotional injury.

Objective

manifestations

of

emotional

distress

or

physical

injury

legitimize

plaintiffs' claims.
Some courts, however, have allowed recovery for extreme and outrageous

29 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). A citizen's lobbying organization sued a media
defendant for three articles about the group that it claimed were defamatory. The
Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit with Justice White mandating that the plaintiffs must 'show clear
and convincing evidence of actual malice by defendants in order to be granted
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
30 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
In Hepps a private figure plaintiff sued a
newspaper for allegedly defamatory statements linking the plaintiff to organized
crime. The Supreme Court held that the communication was a matter of public
concern and that the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the speech was
false.
31

W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 12 at 51.

32

38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).

33 W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 12, at 52. Prosser recognizes that elements
that start out as dependent or parasitic usually evolve into independent legal creatures.
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conduct where plaintiffs do not show bodily harm. 34
defendant's conduct meet a four-part test:

These courts require that

(I) the conduct must be intentional or

reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection
must link the wrongful conduct to the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the
emotional distress must be severe. 35

Prosser postulates that the emotional distress

claim has developed to accomodate circumstances where ·conduct exceed[s] all
bounds

usually

tolerated by decent society, of a

nature which is especially

calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.
requirements of the rule are rigorous and difficult to satisfy."36

The

The examples

Prosser gives of conduct that falls within this category include spreading false
rumors about plaintiff's son's suicide 37 , a practical joker telling a woman her
Husband had just been in an accident and broken both his legs,38 and mishandling
of dead bodies. 39
Subjection to insults, indignity, profanity, obscenity or abuse should not be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the tort of infliction of mental
distress. A tough mental hide 40 is still expected of people living in the everyday
world.
There is still in this country at least, such a thing as liberty to express an
unflattering opinion of another however wounding it may to the other's
feelings; and in the interest not only of freedom of speech but also
avoidance of other more dangerous conduct, it is still very desirable that
some safety valve be left through which rascible tempers may blow off
relatively harmless steam. 41
A tension exists between compensating plaintiffs who have genuinely suffered
injury from a defendant's speech or conduct, and preserving a defendant's first
amendment right to voice his opinions about the plaintiff.

On the one hand,

undermining a plaintiff's right to be compensated for severe emotional injury is not

34 See, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v.
Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W. 2d 428 (1930); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1930).
35 Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974).
Virginia seems to only allow recovery absent physical injury when these four
elements are proven.
36

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).

37

Bielitski v. Obadiak, 61 D.L.R. 494 (1921).

38

Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D. 57 [1897].

39

Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972).

40 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
41

W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 12, at 54.
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desirable.

On the other hand, the first amendment considerations of promoting

open, robust debate should not be ignored either.

The following analyses discuss

these competing interests with three methods of resolving their conflicts and the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
The Separateness Approach
Treating the torts of emotional distress and libel as mutually independent
holds much logical appeal.

Until recently, the torts have evolved separately and
distinctly with no apparent overlap or intertwining. 42 Theoretically the two causes
of action protect different interests.

Emotional distress recovery

protects a

plaintiff's interest in his peace of mind; a libel recovery protects against injury to
a plaintiff's reputation. In most courts,the emotional distress tort now has a
viability of its own.

No longer must a plaintiff bring some other cause of action

to serve as a vehicle for emotional distress recovery. 43
The United States court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Falwell,
applying Virginia law, has recognized independent recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The failure of an accompanying libel claim did not deter the
court from upholding Falwell's $200,000 award for emotional distress.

The

court in Falwell found authority for its position in Womack v. Eldridge,44 a 1974
Virginia case setting out a four-part test for recovery for emotional distress
absent physical injury.45

The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court jury's

finding that Flynt's conduct was intentional and outrageous.

They found his

conduct proximately caused Falwell's distress and that his distress was severe. 46
Falwell thus met Virginia's standard of recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
For the proposition that an emotional distress claim may survive despite the
failure of other tortious claims, the Fourth Circuit need only have looked to its
own decision in Rafferty v. SCOtl. 47 Rafferty involved a husband suing his former
wife for attempting to destroy his relationship with his son.

He sought recovery

under two theories: alienation of affection and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

The Fourth Circuit found the husband could not successfully sue for

42 See generally Mead, Suing Media, supra note 9, at 35; Libel Defense
Resource Center, 50-State Survey 1985-86 (\ 986) [hereinafter LDRC Survey]; Note,
First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe
Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (\ 985).
43

See LDRC Survey, supra note 42.

44

215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (\974).

45

See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

46

Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).

47

756 F.2d 335 (\ 985).
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alienation of affection under a Virginia statute 48 , but nevertheless held the facts
were

sufficient to support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 49 "The fact that a tort may have overtones of affection alienation does
not bar recovery on the separate and distinct accompanying wrongdoing.- 50
Recognizing the high threshold of proof a plaintiff must overcome for
recovery for distress the court declared "[i]ntentional infliction of emotional
distress and alienation of affection are two distinct causes of action . . . not only
are the elements of the two causes of action different, butintentional infliction of
emotional distress implies a higher burden of proof than alienation of affection."51
The four-part test required to be met for severe distress recovery is a difficult
standard for plaintiffs to achieve.

Not just one or some of the elements must be

met; they all must be proven by the plaintiff.

That the court recognized the

distress tort's rigorous proof requirements in Rafferty gives credence to their
similar declaration in Falwell that meeting the intent test for. distress satisfies the
stringent intent requirement of the New York Times actual malice standard. 52

Time. Inc. v. Firestone is a Supreme Court case that commentators often cite
as evidence that even though a libel claim fails, a plaintiff can recover for her
mental suffering. 53
Mary Alice Firestone. wife of the head of the Firestone

corporation. sued Time Magazine for erroneously printing that her divorce had
been granted in part on grounds that she was an adulteress.

She withdrew her

libel claim on the eve of trial, but still the jury awarded her $100,000 in damages.
It is logical to assume that the jury saw fit to compensate her for

mental anguish
and the effect Ms. Firestone claimed the article would have on her young son. 54
The Supreme Court thus upheld an apparent recovery for emotional anguish even
where the plaintiff did not succeed with a libel claim.
The only case to date in which a court clearly rejected a cause of action for
libel but nevertheless awarded plaintiff damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club. 55 The suit arose
out of an article by a sports columnist reporting that Chuy, a retired Philadelphia
Eagles football player, was stricken with polycythemia vera, a terminal disease.
Chuy read the report in the paper and believed he must have the fatal disease,
48

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-220 (1981).

49

Rafferty, 756 F.2d at 339.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 339 n.4.

52

Falwell, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986).

53

424 U.S. 448 (1976).

54

Mead, Suing Media, supra note 9, at 46.

55

595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
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although his own doctor had never informed him he had it.

The doctor who told

the sportswriter of Chuy's condition was mistaken; thus the writer printed a
falsity.

Chuy was so upset by the report that he refused to be tested to confirm

the inaccuracy and spent several months anguishing over the possibility of his
imminent death. 56 Chuy sued the doctor and the writer for libel and intentional
infliction of mental distress.
Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found Chuy
to be a public figure, he had to establish actual malice on the sportswriter's part
for libel recovery.

The jury found that the sportswriter did not act with reckless

disregard or entertain serious doubts of the truth of his story.

Regarding the

doctor, the court found no libel because the medical declaration did nothing to
lower Chuy's reputation in the eyes of the community; rather the court found the
publication would evoke sympathy from the public, not scorn or rejection.
Regarding Chuy's emotional distress claim, the Court of Appeals noted that
Pennsylvania had accepted the independent legal vitality of the distress tort.
Defendant's conduct satisfied the tort requirements because the doctor knew or
could have known that when he told the press that Chuy had a fatal disease,
knowing he did not, a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct was possible.
The jury found that the doctor's conduct went beyond all bounds of decency.57
Chuy recovered nothing for libel because his reputation was not damaged, but he
collected $15,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On its face then,

Chuy seems to lend direct support to the Fourth Circuit decision in Falwell
allowing distress recovery in the face of a failed libel cause of action.
The Fourth circuit has hinted in at least one case prior to Falwell that intent
may be an important element in adjudging a libel claim.

Their words in the past

arguably show their similar treatment of intent under libel and intent under
emotional distress, explaining the outcome of Falwell. In Time. Inc. v. Johnston 58

Sports Illustrated published an article about "Sportsman of the Year"

Bill Russell.

One section of the piece recited how Russell had "destroyed" another player,
Johnston,

on

the

intimidating him.

basketball

court

by

outplaying

him

and

psychologically

Johnston sued the author for libel claiming that the article had

damaged him in his chosen profession which was coaching basketball.

Although

Johnston lost his libel suit, the Fourth Circuit may have given a hint as to what
direction it was moving in its discussion of intent of the publisher of the article.
The court noted that the author writing about Russell did not intend to convey
that

Russell

literally

destroyed

Johnston,

but

merely

used

hyperbole as an

Within the Johnston opinion the court cited
59
Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler
in which use of the word blackmail was
interesting way to present his story.

not intended to charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime, and Curtis

56

Id.

57

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d (\965).

58

448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).

59

398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
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Pub. Co. v. Birdsong 60 in which use of the term "bastard" was not actually meant
to say that the subject was actually born out of wedlock.

The Fourth Circuit thus

favors an examination of intent in determining possible defamation liability.
Finally, a 1984 California case cited in plaintiff's opening brief in Falwell may
further support a court's examination of intent or motive under both emotional
distress and libel claims.

In Koch v. Goldway61 plaintiff sued defendant, his

political opponent, for libeling him and severely distressing him by making a vague
suggestion that plaintiff might be a Nazi war criminal.

The District Court for the

Central District of California
dismissed the libel claim because the statement was nonactionable opinion, but
went on to inquire into the intent of the speaker in regards to the emotional
distress claim.

Finding that the facts did not reveal an "intent to cause, or a

reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress,,62 the distress
claim failed too.

The fact that the court continued to search the facts for a basis

for distress recovery nowithstanding a failed libel claim arguably supports the
separateness approach which was used by the Fourth Circuit in Falwell.
Treating the torts of emotional distress and defamation as independent may
not necessarily forfeit first amendment interests.

The instances in which a jury

will find speech or conduct outrageous and distress severe will be few.
few

cases,

however,

a

plaintiff

still

must

prove

intent

to

In those

cause

Confessions by defendants of intent to distress a plaintiff will be rare.

distress.
Larry

Flynt's emphatic deposition is almost certainly a once in a lifetime gift to the
plaintiff's attorney in an emotional distress suit. 63 The court in Falwell points out
that emotional distress tort requires intentional or reckless misconduct by the
defendant. The court declared that
[t)his is precisely the level of fault that New York Times requires in an
action for defamation. The first amendment will not shield such misconduct
resulting in damage to reputation, and neither will it shield such misconduct
which results in severe emotional distress. We, therefore, hold that when the
first amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the
standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional or
reckless
misconduct has proximately caused the injury complained of. The
jury made such a finding here, and thus the constitutional standard is
sa tisfied. 64
Treating libel and emotional distress independently therefore does not sacrifice
first amendment concerns.

This approach does not place a blanket prohibition on

recovery for emotional distress in spite of a failed libel claim.
60

360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966).

61

607 F.Supp. 223 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

62

[d. at 226.

Legitimate injuries

63 Smith, Note, (concerning Falwell and the believability of fact requirement)
(available from WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW) (unpublished manuscript) (1987-88)
64

Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275.
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consequently do not go unredressed.
The Contingency Approach
Language in the Koch case can support an approach different from the
separateness approach taken in Falwell.
incongruous

to

classify

a

In Koch, the court said that "lilt is

statement,

for

purposes

of

defamation,

as

a

constitutionally protected statement of opinion, but then determine that the same
statement is so outrageous that it justifies recovery for intentional inflicition of
emotional distress."65

Koch suggests that when a libel claim is coupled with a

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress the latter claim's fate is
contingent on the success of the former. If a plaintiff proves libel then he may
If a court rejects a libel claim a plaintiff cannot use

collect for distress as well.
emotional

distress

as

a

basis

for

recovery.

The

contingency

approach

is

conditioned on the existence of either a public figure plaintiff or subject matter of
public interest and that the communication in question not be false statements of
fact.

Suits involving private figure plaintiffs or private matters have a lower

threshold of proof than constitutional actual malice. In the same way, publications
that convey false statements of fact

do not leave the defense of truth

to

defendants, and plaintiffs will be one step closer to recovery.
The first amendment protects speech from prosecution or repression with few
limited exceptions. 66 Speech that libels someone by damaging his reputation is not
protected.
of

the

When speech is not defamatory, however, and does not fall under one
other

categories

of

communication undisturbed.

unprotected

speech,

courts

should

leave

the

To punish defendants for speech that emotionally

distresses someone opens up a whole new category of speech left unprotected by
the first amendment.

The courts and constitutional scholars may not be ready for

such a departure from the New York Times rule.
Under the Court's reasoning in Gertz "[h)owever pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend on its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but
on 'the competition of other ideas."67

One of the policies underlying first

amendment freedom of speech is' to encourage "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen"68 debate, a principal to be kept in mind when considering
punishment for speech some may find distressing and outrageous.

The Supreme

Court has said even "vulgar" communications receive first amendment protection. 69
As with the separateness approach the contingency method on what interests
a court deems to have priority:
65
66

an individual's interest in personal peace of mind,

Koch v. Goldway, 607 F.Supp. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.

67

Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (l974).

68

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (l964).

69

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948).
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or a constitutional interest in protecting freedom of speech.

The appeal of the

contingency approach is that constitutional rights will assume top priority while
individual interests in peace of mind are sacrificed in only a few limited situations:
when a public figure or private figure with a matter of public interest sues on a
communication not asserting false statements of fact the plaintiff will nol recover
for distress because he has not been libeled.

Private figures are thus still

protected (unless the communication is a matter of general public interest).

Public

figures will still recover if a defendant knowingly published lies about them.
The contingency approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's standard of
lesser protection for public figures. 70 The political arena is a particularly 'public'
place.

Hurt feelings are part and parcel of political debate.

Public officials and

figures who purposely take part in the discourse voluntarily subject themselves to
"the vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks· 71 that may
distress some individuals. 72 Moreover, public officials and figures have ready
access to the media to respond to and rebut criticism against them.
The Fourth Circuit in Falwell satisfied itself thatconstitutional issues were
not a problem in awarding recovery for emotional distress absent a successful
defamation claim. Focusing on the test of New York Times, the court said that the
heart

of

the

actual

malice

standard is culpability--whether a defendant's
misconduct was knowing or reckless. 73 The Fourth Circuit equates constitutional
actual malice with the first prong of the test for common law severe emotional
distress.
The test of New York Times and its progeny is whether a defendant published
a statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
of the statement.1 4 The Court has said a defendant must have entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication to be guilty oflibel. 75 The Fourth Circuit
chose to focus on the intent and reckless disregard portion of the actual malice
test, ignoring the requirement of falsity of the publication.

Therein lies the flaw

in the court's reasoning under the second approach.

The most meaningful

support for the theory of the contingency approach is found in a case that facially
supported the separateness approach, Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club.1 6
Chuy did not prove he was libeled, yet still recovered $15,000 for emotional
distress.

Chuy was not libeled because his reputation was not lowered in the eyes

70

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc: v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).

71

[d. at 1561.

72

Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1985).

73

Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275.

74

See, e.g., supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.

75

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 u.S. 727 (1968).

76

595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.1979).
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of third parties.

He suffered severe distress, however, because he believed the

publication that asserted he had a fatal disease.
article asserted false statements of fact.

The crucial point is that the

The article was believable, unlike Falwell

in which the jury found no one would reasonably believe the ad parody to be
asserting statements of fact.?7

Because Chuy was only allowed to recover on a

distress claim in which he was a public figure and the publication was a believable
lie, all first amendment concerns of not punishing protected speech were satisfied.
Knowinglypublished

lies

are

never

protected.

Conversely,

the

Falwell

communication was not a lie, but a joke.
Pring

v.

Penthouse

International.

Ltd. 78

a

case

from

the

Tenth

Circuit

supports the notion that a communication must be believable; in other words, false
statements of fact must be asserted for any recovery on the speech.

The Tenth

Circuit noted that the test for liability is not whether the speech was labeled as
"humor" or "fiction" but whether a reader would reasonably

understand

the

publication "as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which
she participated."79

The published story in Pring lampooned the Miss America

contest and described how Miss Wyoming imagined she would win because of her
special talent.

That talent was causing men to levitate as she performs an act of

fellatio on them.
television.

The article describes Miss Wyoming doing these acts on national

The real Miss Wyoming in the Miss America contest sued Penthouse

magazine for defamation, invasion of privacy (false light) and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 80
Ruling for Penthouse, the court described the article as rhetorical hyperbole
and obviously a complete fantasy.81
conveying statements of fact.

No one would take the article literally or as

Miss Wyoming thus had no claim for libel recovery

because the story contained no falsity because it was not believable.

The facts of

Pring are remarkably similar to- the facts of Falwell, yet the outcome entirely
opposite.

The

Fourth

Circuit

in

Falwell

failed

to

address

the

falsity

or

believability of ad parody and focused solely on Flynt's intent as evidenced by his
deposition.

Yet the Tenth Circuit in Pring declared that "[ilt would serve no

useful purpose to treat separately the . . . 'outrageous conduct' doctrine . . . as
the same First Amendment considerations must be applied."82 Constitutional actual
malice (intentional or reckless disregard of the truth) thus does not equal common
law malice of emotional distress (ill will or spite).
emotional

distress

test

does

not

satisfy

all

Meeting the first prong of the
constitutional

concerns.

77

Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1271.

78

695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).

79

Pring, 695 F.2d at 442.

80

Id. at 440-42.

81

Id. at 443.

82

Id. at 442.
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The

constitutional

actual

malice

test

must override and

permeate all claims for

recovery.
If emotional distress claims do not rise and fall with accompanying defamation
claims then defendants may be held liable for otherwise constitutionally protected
opinion.

An opinion cannot be libelous because an opinion is, never false.

Yet

under the second approach mere expression of opinion can be punishable and thus
chilled if the opinion causes someone sever emotional distress.
The

Fourth

Circuit

in

Falwell successfully

punishing constitutionally protected opinion
recovery.
Question

evaded

the

implications

of

through severe emotional distress

The court simply said "[w)e need not consider whether the statements in
constituted

OplDlOn, as

the

issue

is

whether

their

publication

was

sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress."83
It is fairly obvious though, that Flynt was conveying a highly unfavorable opinion

of Falwell and his conservative political and ideological views.
Writers, editorialists, cartoonists and the like convey their opinions of people
publicly.

Unflattering cartoons and

spoofs about famous

people appear

in

newspapers every day.

Those who are lampooned regularly sue those newspapers.
An example is Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. 84 in which a nursing home
brought suit against The Miami Herald over a cartoon it published portraying
gangsters in a decaying building identified as a nursing home which had been
closed down by the state.

The gangsters were shown holding moneybags. The

caption read "Don't worry, Boss, we can always reopen it as a haunted house for
the kiddies."85

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit said

that "cartoonists employ hyperbole, exaggeration, and caricature to communicate
their messages to the reader.

One cannot reasonably interpret a cartoon as

literally depicting an actual event or situation . . . . Rather the cartoonist must be
viewed as having utilized the art of exaggeration to express [his opinion)."86

The

Eleventh Circuit's reasoning applies to the Falwell case and is consistent with the
contingency approach. Only looking at whether an individual was "distressed" by a
cartoon or spoof ignores important first amendment protections for opinion.
Courts should not treat emotional distress claims and defamation claims as
separate

and

distinct

entities

because

the

former

ignores

precedent

of

constitutional dimension that goes to great lengths to preserve freedom of speech.
The test for malice is not the same under each cause of action as the Fourth
Circuit believes.

The same interests are not protected by each, and when both are

brought in a suit, the federal constitutional interest in freedom of speech must
override the state created common law interest in protecting an individual's peace
of mind.

83

Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276.

84

778 F.2d 711 (1985).

85

[d. at 713.

86

[d. at 712.
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The Balancing Approach
The third approach utilizes a sort of two-tiered balancing of instances in
which a mental distress claim survives a libel claim.

If a court is satisfied that a

plaintiff hasfulfilled all the requirements for recovery for emotionaldistress then a
second inquiry is in order.

The court will examine the particular speech at issue

and determine its overall value in light of the goals of ensuring freedom of speech.
For example, the court may find the speech to be educational or informative, or, it
may find it to be merely entertaining or even exploitive.

The court should then

weigh the interest in protecting the type of speech against the individual's interest
in recovering for damage to peace of mind.

If the speech is the type that the

first amendment was originally meant to promote then the plaintiff will lose on his
emotional distress claim. If, on the other hand, the speech is of little value and it
contributes little to the marketplace of ideas then a plaintiff's interest in peace of
mind will rise above constitutional concerns and he can recover for distress.

This

balancing approach is a compromise between the separateness and contingency
approach, not entirely sacrificing individual interest to constitutional interest or
vice-versa. Moreover, Falwell is consistent with a balancing analysis.
The ad parody Hustler published was at best a tasteless joke and probably
offensive to most people.

The Fourth Circuit did not find the jury's conclusion

erroneous that Falwell's distress was severe and that he fulfilled the four distress
requirements.

Having proven severe distress, then the court should have weighed

Falwell's interests against the value of the speech at issue and concluded Falwell's
interest in recovery outweighed any educational, informative or literary value the
ad parody could possibly or remotely have.
This approach is not revolutionary or sUrprising.

The Supreme Court has

been making judgments as to speech's value for many years. Child pornography
has no value for the Court 87 and commercial speech only limited value. 88 The
Court holdspolitical speech, however, in high regard. 89
Depending on how
important the speech is, the Court allows either minimal or substantial regulation
of the speech.
The Fourth Circuit has suggested that only normal orlegitimate hyperbole falls
under constitutional protection. 90

While the court found the Sports Illustrated

article in Time. Inc. v. Johnston 91 to be normal stylistic use of exaggeration, one
can infer from the opinion that gross or perverse distortion of a public figure's
87

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).

88 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
89 See generally BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech:
Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits 0/ Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).

90

448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).

91

Id.
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An

private life may not be shielded by the first amendment. 92
Sometimes constitutional
speech.

priorities defeat

recovery on otherwise libelous

In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,93 the plaintiff sued Senator William Proxmire

for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out the
Senator's awarding plaintiff the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" for wasteful
government spending.

The plaintiff was ascientist who used government funds to

study emotional behavior and aggression in animals. He claimed that as a result of
the nationwide pUblicity of him receiving the undesirable award his academic and
professional standing had been damaged and he had suffered severe distress.9 4
The Seventh Circuit ruled in Senator Proxmire's favor holding that the
statements were constitutionally protected by the Speech or Debate Clause 95 , and
thus the alleged defamatory statements were privileged.

The Supreme Court

reversed, but on the grounds that the statements were not made on the floor of
Congress or in Congressional debate and thus were not protected under Speech or
Debate Clause immunity.

The Court seemed to say that if the statements had

fallen under that qualified privilege the plaintiff would have no recognizable claim
for recovery.

The importance of constitutional qualified privilege in that instance

outweighed the plaintiff's interest in recovery for injury to his peace of mind.
Because the speech was so important, individual interest had to be sacrificed.

As

the Seventh Circuit noted in regards to plaintiff's emotional distress claim "[w]e
view these additional allegations of harm as merely the results of the statements
made by the defendants.

If the alleged defamatory falsehoods themselves are

privileged, it would defeat the privilege to allow recovery for the specified
damages which they caused."96
Critique of the balancing approach
A

two-tiered

type

of

balancing approach

poses

some

unique

problems.

Whereas the foregoing analyses of the separateness approach and the contingency
approach reflect the advantages and disadvantages of each other, the balancing
approach requires a separate critique.

First, although this observation may apply

to the first two approaches as well, the quality and quantity of proof needed to
establish

severity of emotional

distress

indication of the current trend.

may

be declining if Falwell is any

The only evidence Falwell presented of the

severity of his distress was his own assertion that the ad caused him anguish.

In

addition, a colleague of his testified that Falwell's enthusiasm seemed to have
92

!d. at 380.

93

579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. III (1979).

94

Id.

95 U.S. Const. art. I, § 6,
96

Proxmire, 579 F.2d at 1035.
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diminished after he saw the Hustler ad. 97

Such subjective, self-serving testimony

should not be sufficient to establish "severe" distress.

Falwell's distress does not

come close to the examples of severe distress cited in the Restatement of Torts. 98
A

ready

finding

of severe

distress comes close

to a

situation

where

first.

amendment freedoms may be unnecessarily sacrificed.
Several commentators 99 argue that although the tort of mental distress is
composed

of

four

elements,

they

blur

outrageousness of the defendant'sconduct.

into

one

determining

factor--the

The jury has no objective guide in

judging what speech is outrageous; their decision is based on a subjective "gut
feeling" more than anything else.

The Restatement of Torts merely states the test

as whether the conduct would arouse the ire of the average member of the
community.IOO
A substantial danger exists in hinging first amendment freedoms on local
community standards.

Legitimate criticisms of public figures may be punished

simply because members of a particular jury find the criticism offensive.

One

commentator postulates that tort liability should not be imposed on what might be
found to be extreme and outrageous conduct or speech because censorship of
unpopular ideas will result. IOI Juries can simply chill speech by imposing liability
for ideas or utterances they view as outrageous. 102
97

An example of the resulting

Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1277.

§ 46 (1965).
The fact that Falwell
98 Restatement (Second) of Torts
reproduced the parody and included it in his religious mailings brings the sincerity
of his distress into question!

99 Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by· Outrageous
Conduct, 82 COLUM L. REV. 42 (1982); Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort
Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1750-51 (1985) [hereinafter Note, First Amendment Limits on Emotional
Distress].
100

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965).

101

Note, First Amendment Limits on Emotional Distress, supra note 99, at 1761.

102 An obvious danger arises when community standards become the sole
determinant factor a jury uses when deciding whether a defendant will be punished
for his speech.
Author Richard Bernstein had this to say about the tort of
emotional distress being applied to the first amendment:
First, extreme and outrageous language will often be associated with
unpopular ideas (and in the Falwell case an unpopular defendant as well).
Second, it will be very difficult for an appellate court to determine whether
it is such language or rather the accompanying message that is the real
object of the trier of fact's disapproval. The Supreme Court is not likely to
find that judges and juries can be relied on to divorce their perceptions of
what kind of language is extreme and outrageous from their perceptions of
what ideas are extreme and outrageous..
Allowing unfettered regulation of these utterances that can be
characterized as extreme and outrageous would produce even greater
opportunities to censor unpopular ideas.
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self-censorship can be seen in the recent pulling of the Doonsebury comic strip
from many papers across the country because the "Sleaze Parade" series was judged
to be in poor taste and possibly defamatory.

The strip portrayed members of the

Reagan Administration that were fired or left under suspicious circumstances. One
editor commented that their largely conservative readership might find the cartoon
objectionable. 103 The possibility of being sued over thecartoons' publication likely
played a role in their decision to pull the strip.
A

look

understanding

at

the

the

language

danger

the

v. Cali/ornia l04

of Cohen
Supreme

Court

has

may be helpful

recognized

in

government to regulate communications as offensive or profane.

in

allowing

The Court

predicted that government could stifle the expression of unpopular views under the
guise of censoring offensive or profane words. 105
Again the Supreme Court
emphasized that freedom of expression warrants great protection.

"One of the

perogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and
measures--and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the
freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.',106

The Court in Cohen noted

too that words are selected as much for their emoti ve force as their cogni ti ve
force. 107
Fear of juries running roughshod over freedom of speech may be overblown.
At the same time the Supreme Court gave communities power to decide what was
obscene and what was not, the Court limited jury discretion to do so. In Jenkins
v. Georgia l08 a jury found the film Carnal Knowledge to be obscene and thus
Note, First Amendment Limits on Emotional Distress, supra note 99, at 1759.
The Restatement directs the trier of fact to use the following guide for the
tort of emotional distress:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to
an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor and lead him to exclaim: "Outrageous!"
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 comment d (1965).

103 Suits Over Cartoons Chill Commentary, The News Media & The Law,
Summer 1986 at 14.
104 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen a young man was convicted for wearing a
jacket that displayed the phrase "Fuck the Draft" on it. He wore the jacket inside
a courthouse. The Supreme Court overturned his conviction saying that what some
may find offensive may be another man's lyric. [d. at 25.
105

[d. at 26.

106

[d. (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944».

107

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.

108

418 U.S. 153 (1974).
134

prohibited its showing in local theaters.

The Supreme Court reversed, declaring

that juries do not have unbridled discretion in determining what is patently
offensive. 109

Mere scenes of nudity did not qualify the film as obscene.

The

Court therefore overrode community standards, second-guessing a jury finding.
The Court may feel compelled to do the same if a jury, for example, finds a simple
insult to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.

Juries thus may not have

complete discretion in judging the legitimacy of an emotional distress claim.
Allowing courts to choose certain types of speech over others on the basis of
the inherent value of the speech is arguably against much precedent, especially for
speech similar to that in Falwell.

The following quote from Pring v. Penthouse I 10

with facts similar to Falwell illustrates the point well.
The story is a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss
America contest and contestants.
It has no redeeming features whatever.
There is no accounting for the vast divergence in views and ideas. However,
the First Amendment was intended to cover them all. The First Amendment
is not limited to statements, or positions which are accepted; which are not
outrageous; which are decent and popular; which are constructive or have
some redeeming element; or which do not deviate from community standards
and norms; or which are within prevailing religious or moral standards.
Although a story may be repugnant in the extreme to an ordinary reader, and
we have encountered no difficulty in placing this story in such a category,
the typical standards and doctrines under the First Amendment must
nevertheless be applied . . . . The First Amendment standards are not
adjusted to a particular type of publication or particular subject matter. I I I
This lengthy but enlightening passage directly conflicts with the analytical
method of the balancing approach--judging the value of the speech in question to
determine whether it deserves protection in the face of an emotional distress
claim.

In sum, the third approach is appealing because it strikes a compromise and

falls between the extremes of the first two approaches.

At the same time, some

will feel that individual interests in mental peace are not given enough weight,
while first amendment champions will be disturbed by possible speech repression.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs are pleading intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as
defamation in increasing numbers. 112 Courts should try to establish a uniform
method for handling situations where a libel claim fails but an emotional distress
claim survives based on the same facts.

This article advances three approaches to

resolution of this problem.
First, a court may follow Falwell and treat distress and libel as totally
separate, independent claims.

Second, a court can declare a distress claim's

success to be contingent on the establishment of a viable libel claim, given that a
109

[d. at 160.

110

695 F.2d 438 (I982).

III

[d. at 443.

112

See supra note 9.
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public figure or matter. of public interest is involved and no false facts are
asserted in the communication.
test.

Third, a court may employ a two-tiered balancing

Upon satisfaction of emotional distress elements a court will then determine

the value of the speech at issue.

If the speech is valuable plaintiff's distress

If the speech holds little value then plaintiff's distress claim will

claim must fail.

survive a failed libel claim. This author favors the contingency approach primarily
because constitutional guarantees of freedom in the Bill of Rights are the basis of
our entire legal system.
be heard as well.

Not repressing bad speech ensures that good speech will

It is unfortunate but necessary that a few severely distressed

plaintiffs will suffer in the wake of first amendment guarantees.
As Judge

Wilkinson

accurately points out "Hustler magazine

is a

singularly unappealing beneficiary of First Amendment value and serves only to
remind us of the costs a democracy must pay for its most precious privilege of
open political debate."113 Few would deny that the ad parody in dispute was
tasteless and ridiculous.

At the same time its publication did not defame Falwell.

To disallow Falwell's libel claim while allowing recovery under his emotional
distress claim creates an end run around the requirement of constitutional actual
malice for defamation recovery.

To permit recovery under a tort of a different

name asserted on the exact same set of facts defeats the purpose of the first
amendment and the license it gives us for uninhibited debate.
The decision in Falwell v. Flynt undoubtedly chills the exercise of free
speech.

The idea behind freedom of speech is that good speech will correct bad

speech and that competition of ideas is healthy.
regulate political speech.

The marketplace is the means to

In this instance the Reverend Falwell as a public figure

has immediate, practically unlimited access to media channels to respond to Flynt's
communication.
If the thrust of New York Times and its progeny is indeed intent, fault, and
culpability as a basis for liability then' the Fourth Circuit has interpreted the law
correctly.

Maybe Falwell is an exceptional case and only publications like the ad

parody, which admittedly hold little if any literary or informational value, will
come under the rule of recovery for emotional distress.

Unfortunately, Falwell

may only be the first step down a slippery slope leading to pre-New York Times
era when ill will was enough to, punish a publisher for communicating something
that was not false.
If the real heart of New York Times is truth or falsity of a communication
then the Fourth Circuit has made an unfortunate mistake.
has been set in Falwell.

Dangerous precedent

To allow a public figure plaintiff to recover merely

because his feelings were hurt necessarily means that plaintiffs could recover for
true statements.

Such a result is without precedent and flies in the face of the

purpose of the first amendment. Placing in the hands of the jury the discretion to
determine whether someone can be punished for expression that does not fall under
community standard of acceptability or non-offensiveness surely means that "we
have entered a brave new world of First Amendment jurisprudence."114
113

Falwell, 805 F.2d at 484.

114

[d. at 488.
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